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INTRODUCTION 
The Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act 
(LHWCA),1 first passed in 1927 and significantly amended in 1972, 
provides compensation for employees injured in the course of certain 
maritime employment.2  Initially, the Act’s strict location-based 
requirement allowed only those injured on “navigable waters” to 
receive compensation, but the 1972 amendments extended coverage 
to workers who were injured on certain “adjoining areas,” provoking 
much controversy over which workers could receive coverage and 
where they must be working.3  Today, claimants must satisfy both a 
status (employment) requirement and a situs (geographical) 
requirement to receive coverage.4  Essentially, the question becomes 
how far to extend coverage, and the courts have split, most favoring 
one extreme or the other.5 
                                                          
 1. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C §§ 901–950 
(2012) (originally enacted as Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (amended 1972)) [hereinafter LHWCA].  
 2. Id. § 903(a).  
 3. See id. (1972 statutory language); Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 1251, 
1251 (1972); Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 
69-803, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927) (amended 1972) [hereinafter LHWCA of 
1927] (1927 statutory language); Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Who Is Covered?  Recent Cases 
Regarding Longshore Situs and Status, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 265, 295–312 (2003–04) 
(discussing the evolution of LHWCA situs case law and the varied approaches of the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in particular).  
 4. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1977); see also P. 
C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 73–75, 78 (1979) (considering the scope of the 
“maritime employment” status requirement for non-enumerated workers in light of 
the Act’s legislative history and Congress’s discernable intent). 
 5. See infra Part I.A–B (deducing this question from the continued expansion of 
the LHWCA and the differences in circuit court interpretations).  For a broad 
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On April 29, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
decided a worker’s compensation case under the LHWCA, holding 
that the worker’s injury had not occurred on a qualifying situs.6  The 
court looked to the “plain meaning” of the Act, overruling its former 
precedent in Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester,7 and adopted an 
approach similar to the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the 
situs requirement.8  This result differs significantly from the Third 
and Ninth Circuits’ broad interpretations of the Act, which focus on 
Congress’s intent in passing the Act, rather than the plain meaning of 
the statute.9  Such liberal interpretations provide that sites further 
from navigable waters qualify for coverage, but they also potentially 
fail to put appropriate bounds on the Act; as a result, some courts 
utterly disregard the Act’s situs requirement in cases that satisfy the 
status requirement and provide over-inclusive coverage beyond what 
Congress likely intended.10 
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit inappropriately 
overruled its own precedent, using a simplistic, plain-meaning 
interpretation of the LHWCA to discard Congress’s purpose in 
passing the Act and create further inconsistency in the relief provided 
to injured workers by the various circuit courts.  Part I of this 
Comment examines the LHWCA’s background and legislative history 
and discusses relevant case law from the circuit courts.  Part II 
analyzes the courts’ implementation of the LHWCA using the canons 
of construction and compares the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ narrow 
approaches with the Third and Ninth Circuits’ broad approaches.  
                                                          
interpretation of coverage, see Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 
(9th Cir. 1978), and Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 
F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).  For a strict statutory construction of coverage, see New 
Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 
2013) (en banc), and Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 6. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 386, 394 (describing the company as a 
container repair and maintenance facility located on a site 300 yards from shore 
without access to water and surrounded by non-maritime businesses). 
 7. 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), overruled in part by New Orleans 
Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 8. See New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 394–95 (adopting a plain meaning 
interpretation of the statute as the best way to correctly follow congressional intent 
and avoid subverting Congress’s policy concerns for the Court’s own); see also Sidwell, 
71 F.3d at 1138 (espousing a plain-meaning interpretation of the statute that differed 
from the expansive interpretations of other circuits at the time).  
 9. See Herron, 568 F.2d at 141 (employing a factors test to determine whether 
Congress would likely have intended coverage for injuries sustained on a given situs); 
Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at 638 (eliminating the situs requirement in cases satisfying the 
status requirement under the theory that it would undermine Congress’s goal of 
eradicating shifting or uncertain coverage). 
 10. See, e.g., Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at 638 (discarding the situs requirement after 
determining that the status requirement made it superfluous).  
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This Comment concludes that Congress should abolish the Act’s situs 
requirement in favor of a status-only test and revise its statutory 
language to clearly reflect its intent.  In the meantime, the circuit 
courts should standardize their approaches to the situs question so 
that arbitrary line-drawing does not lead to inconsistent results 
among similarly-situated employees in different jurisdictions.  The 
resulting approach would reflect the Ninth Circuit’s flexible—but not 
overbroad—factors test, which considers whether the site is 
appropriate for maritime use, whether nearby properties are 
dedicated to maritime activity, whether the site is close to the 
waterway, and whether it could feasibly be closer.11  
I. BACKGROUND 
Grasping the currently muddled state of LHWCA jurisprudence 
and the need for statutory revision12 requires an examination of the 
Act’s evolution from its initial passage in 1927 to the present day.  
Such an examination of the Act and the related jurisprudence reveals 
that problems of fair and coherent line-drawing have plagued 
                                                          
 11. Herron, 568 F.2d at 141.  Most of the LHWCA literature thus far focuses on 
the Act’s history or its status requirement.  See, e.g., George R. Alvey, Jr. & John O. 
Pieksen, Jr., Falling in and out of Coverage:  Jurisprudential Legislating Eviscerates the Status 
Requirement of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 
227, 248–52 (1995) (discussing erosion of the status requirement); F. Nash Bilisoly, 
The Relationship of Status and Damages in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 72 TUL. L. REV. 
493, 518 (1997) (outlining the relationship between status and damages and 
concluding that statutory revision will not improve the situation); Charles Clark, The 
Expanding Coverage of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 43 LA. L. 
REV. 849, 849 (1983) (focusing on LHWCA history); Fitzhugh, supra note 3, at 266 
(detailing the history of the LHWCA, the effect of the 1972 amendments, and the 
ways in which courts have managed to blur seemingly clear statutory lines); David W. 
Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at 
the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 401, 412–16 
(2013) (descriptive piece detailing developments in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); 
Stephen P. Hall, Note, The LHWCA Situs Requirement—Adjoining Area Construed Broadly 
in Keeping with the Remedial Purpose of the Act—Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 6 
MAR. LAW. 118 (1981) (describing the contents of the Winchester decision). However, 
there are a few exceptions.  See, e.g., Nicole J. Dulude & Todd Greenwood, Close-
Hauling Toward Simplified Eligibility Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act:  A Proposal for Congressional Action or Judicial Clarification to Rectify 
Persistent Ambiguity, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 45, 59 (2010) (proposing both a congressional 
and a judicial solution to the problem of off-shore oilfields, whose drilling platforms 
have been termed “artificial islands”); Donald S. Morton, Comment, The 
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act:  Coverage After the 1972 
Amendments, 55 TEX. L. REV. 99, 125 (1976) (identifying the ambiguous terms in the 
situs requirement without suggesting a means to resolve these ambiguities).  In the 
course of discussing the history of the Act and analyzing various problems, all of 
these articles touch on Congress’s legislative intent to varying degrees.   
 12. See Fitzhugh, supra note 3, at 266 (outlining the courts’ confusion regarding 
the limits of coverage under the Act). 
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Congress, courts, and plaintiffs since before the statute’s inception.13  
This section will first outline the specific conditions prompting 
Congress’s passage of the LHWCA and its subsequent revisions and 
then scrutinize specific court opinions that have influenced or 
contributed to the current circuit split. 
A. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) 
Most pertinent among the various iterations of the LHWCA are the 
1927 version—for a historical understanding of the Act—and the 
1972 amendments, which significantly expanded the scope of the Act.  
Accordingly, this Comment addresses these critical developments in 
the following two sections. 
1. The 1927 enactment 
In 1927, Congress enacted the first iteration of the 
Longshoremen’s14 and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(LHWCA)15 in response to failed attempts to cover maritime workers 
under state and federal workers’ compensation schemes.16  In the 
seminal 1917 case, Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,17 the Supreme Court 
ruled unconstitutional New York State’s attempt to provide 
compensation for maritime workers under the New York Workmen’s 
Compensation Act because it infringed on the federal government’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases in admiralty and maritime law.18  
It also held inapplicable both the 1906 and 1908 Federal Employers’ 
                                                          
 13. See infra Part I.A-B (noting that over the years, Congress has struggled to 
amend the LHWCA adequately, courts have struggled to interpret the Act properly, 
and plaintiffs have struggled for relief under it).   
 14. A longshoreman is “one who is employed at a seaport to work at the loading 
and unloading of ships.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1334 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1981) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY]. 
 15. LHWCA of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927) 
(amended 1972). 
 16. See, e.g., First Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 
Stat. 232 (acting as the first congressional compensation attempt, which was 
overruled by Howard v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 463, 499, 504 (1908)); 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (serving as 
the second congressional compensation attempt, which was held invalid by Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212 (1917)); Jensen v. S. Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600, 601 
(N.Y. 1915) (citing the New York Workmen’s Compensation Act’s 1914 statutory 
language, which grants coverage in New York to injured employees engaged in 
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce), rev’d, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); see also 
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217–18 (rejecting the States’ authority to provide state workers’ 
compensation coverage to maritime employees injured on shore); N.Y. WORKERS’ 
COMP. LAW § 113 (McKinney 2006) (current amended version of the 1914 law cited 
in Jensen, 109 N.E. at 601).  
 17. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 18. Id. at 217–18.  
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Liability Acts, determining that they applied exclusively to common 
carriers with significant railroad operations.19  The absurd 
consequence of this decision was that the plaintiff in Jensen had no 
remedy for her husband’s death, which took place on board a 
steamship as he was unloading it with a small electric freight truck.20 
Initially, the LHWCA read: 
Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of 
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or 
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of 
the United States (including any dry dock[21]) and if recovery for 
the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings 
may not validly be provided by State law.22 
In effect, the new law contained a strictly defined situs requirement 
and no status requirement.23  Only those injured on “navigable 
waters” could recover for their injuries, while those injured on land, 
certain docks, piers, or wharves received compensation through state 
compensation schemes.24  This meant that where a worker’s 
misfortune occurred determined how he would receive 
compensation, despite the arbitrariness of changing his coverage as 
he crossed the gangplank onto the pier.25  Under the 1927 version of 
the LHWCA, a longshoreman injured on the landward side of his 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 212–13.  
 20. Id. at 208, 218; see also H.R. REP. NO. 67-639, at 8 (1922) (bemoaning the pre-
LHWCA state of affairs as “extremely confusing [and] doubly deplorable, for it works 
not only a great injustice to the men themselves, but to their employers as well, who 
are compelled to carry double insurance”).   
 21. A dry dock is “a dock that can be kept dry for use during the construction or 
repairing of ships.”  WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 697.  Dry docks are 
often located in “navigable waters” but either raise ships out of the water or permit 
water to be temporarily drained away so that the ship is not literally “upon . . . 
navigable waters.”  33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012).   
 22. LHWCA of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927).   
 23. See LHWCA of 1927 §§ 2(3), 3(a) (listing who is not an “employee,” rather 
than defining the term to create a status requirement, and providing compensation 
only for employees injured on “navigable waters”); P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 
69, 73 (1979) (recognizing the rigidity of the 1927 Act’s situs-only test and the 
potential inequities that might arise from it); Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 
432 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1977) (explaining the 1972 transition from a narrow situs-only 
test to the 1972 amendments’ broader situs and status test); MORTON, supra note 11, 
at 102 (observing that pre-1972 coverage was location-based and that those injured 
on a pier only had recourse to state compensation regimes).  
 24. See LHWCA of 1927 § 3 (situs-only requirement); P. C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 72 
(remarking on the Jensen prohibition against LWHCA coverage for longshoremen 
injured on land); Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1135 (4th Cir. 
1995) (noting the 1927 statute’s exclusive use of a “locality test,” which only provided 
coverage on navigable waters while depriving those injured on shore of LHWCA coverage).  
 25. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 
629, 632 (3d Cir. 1976) (commenting on the effects of the Jensen decision, which 
provided for state workers’ compensation coverage while on the pier but resulted in 
a complete lack of coverage after stepping onto the gangplank toward the ship).  
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work site might receive highly inadequate state coverage for a 
crippling injury, while his colleague, suffering the same injury on 
board a ship, received generous federal compensation benefits.26 
Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
typically recommended a liberal interpretation of the Act, as in Voris 
v. Eikel,27 where it noted that the Act should be “liberally construed in 
conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and 
incongruous results.”28  Because Congress enacted this bill specifically 
to cover those who would not otherwise have coverage, the courts 
typically tried to ensure that maritime workers received coverage 
under either the LHWCA or state workers’ compensation laws, even 
if an employee failed to meet certain technical requirements.29  
However, this tendency toward liberal statutory construction did not 
resolve the significant disparity between state and federal coverage.30 
2. The 1972 amendments 
Despite courts’ preference for a liberal interpretation, coverage 
problems persisted for longshoremen, and in 1972, Congress 
amended the Act to afford broader coverage.31  New loading 
techniques, like “containerization and the use of LASH-type vessels,”32 
                                                          
 26. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 12 (1972) (noting the inadequacy of state 
benefits, even under the more generous state compensation programs); H.R. REP. 
NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (1972) (using the same language as the Senate Report). 
 27. 346 U.S. 328 (1953).  
 28. Id. at 333; see also Balt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 
(1932) (citing Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930)) (explaining that 
courts should interpret the Act to avoid inequitable results); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. 
Norton, 106 F.2d 137, 138 (3d Cir. 1939) (declaring that a hyper-technical 
construction of the statute “has not been favored” historically).  In fact, the Court has 
suggested that such laws serve the public interest and spread the costs of injury to the 
industries and customers, who can handle the cost collectively far better than a single 
injured individual could.  See Balt. & Phila. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. at 414.  In 1966, 
practitioner Carl O. Bue, Jr. remarked on “a noticeable increase in emphasis upon 
equitable considerations in the admiralty decisions,” particularly in personal injury 
cases.  Carl O. Bue, Jr., Admiralty Law in the Fifth Circuit—A Compendium for 
Practitioners:  1, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 347, 350 (1966).   
 29. See, e.g., Voris, 346 U.S. at 333–34 (discarding the technical written notice 
requirement where the employer had constructive notice of the injury, and the 
employee was illiterate and thus unable to notify his employer in writing).  
 30. See Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 52 (noting that even the best state 
laws did not come close to meeting the nationally recommended standards). 
 31. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2, 86 Stat. 1251, 1251 (1972); see Dulude & Greenwood, 
supra note 11, at 51–53 (detailing pre-1972 coverage difficulties, particularly the lack 
of coverage for some workers, overlapping coverage for others, and limited state 
workers’ compensation funds in many jurisdictions).  
 32. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 263 (1997) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (1972), and S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 12–13 (1972)).  
Containerization allows traditional longshoring tasks—like loading and unloading a 
ship—to take place entirely on land.  See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 74 
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had effectively moved a good portion of longshoremen’s duties in 
loading and unloading cargo to shore, and Congress wanted to 
ensure that coverage did not depend on a worker’s “fortuitous 
circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land or over water.”33  
Congress specifically stated that: 
The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation 
system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by 
this Act for part of their activity. . . .  The Committee does not 
intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, 
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are 
injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity.34 
It also noted the arbitrariness of the 1927 version of the Act and 
the significant disparity in benefits resulting from different 
coverage.35  For Congress, the issue was not simply lack of clarity as to 
which laws applied in a given situation; it also involved concern that 
longshoremen received different coverage depending on where they 
sustained injury and that such a disparity was potentially unfair.36 
By enacting the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress 
attempted to eliminate this disparity and ensure that workers who 
would normally receive federal coverage for part of their activity 
would be eligible for federal coverage throughout.37  This would solve 
what courts and commentators have referred to as the problem of 
longshoremen and harbor workers “walking in and out of 
coverage.”38  Congress also noted the unsatisfactory coverage that 
                                                          
(1979).  LASH stands for “lighter aboard ship” and refers to certain types of lighters, 
or barges.  Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273 n.35.  After loading and towing a LASH barge to a 
larger main vessel—a LASH vessel or “mother ship”—the larger vessel can load the 
barge and its contents on board via crane and store them there for transport.  Id.  
 33. See S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (1972) (observing that pure (mis)fortune could 
lead a worker injured over water to receive coverage while one injured over land 
doing the same work would not receive coverage); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 
(using identical language to the Senate Report). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (clarifying that employees who only engage in 
further land shipment or clerical duties would not receive coverage); H.R. REP. NO. 
92-1441, at 11 (using the same language as the Senate Report). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11; see also Caputo, 432 
U.S. at 262–63 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1125, 12–13 and H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, 10–11) 
(noting that an injury occurring over water would be covered by adequate federal 
benefits under the Act, but the same injury occurring on land would be subject to 
highly inadequate compensation under state compensation laws). 
 36. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10. 
 37. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11; see also P. C. Pfeiffer 
Co., 444 U.S. at 75 (affirming this idea with reference to the Caputo decision’s 
treatment of the Act’s legislative history).  
 38. See, e.g., Caputo, 432 U.S. at 257 (noting the “amphibious nature” of 
longshoremen’s work and the need to provide more extensive coverage); Dir., Office 
of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 332–33 (1983) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on the problem of longshoremen “walking in 
and out of coverage”); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 511 (5th 
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most state workers’ compensation laws provided as one reason to 
provide uniform coverage for all of a maritime employee’s work; 
those workers covered under state compensation laws received 
inadequate benefits, even in generous states.39 
These amendments created separate status and situs 
requirements.40  A worker had to be a qualifying employee working in 
a qualifying location.41  As a result, the LHWCA currently states that 
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, compensation shall 
be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an 
employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury 
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States 
(including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building 
way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an 
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or 
building a vessel).42 
The Act also defines “employee” to mean “any person engaged in 
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person 
engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including 
a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker.”43  This new 
formulation so vastly expanded coverage that in 1984, Congress 
                                                          
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (reiterating the Court’s language from P.C. Pfeiffer Co., which 
described the problem as one in which workers “walk[] in and out of coverage” 
despite remaining in the situs area), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., 
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc); S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (expressing a desire to eliminate the arbitrary 
nature of LHWCA coverage and enact a comprehensive, reliable compensation 
scheme); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (using the same language as the Senate 
Report); Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 81 (discussing the problem in 
relation to the plight of those engaged in off-shore oil drilling, where fixed oil 
platforms have been termed “artificial islands”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 67-639, at 1–2 
(1922) (indicating a desire for uniformity of coverage even in 1922).  
 39. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 12; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10.  
 40. The amendments therefore “eliminated the longshoremen’s maximum 
compensation rate by 1975, removed unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery by 
longshoremen against shipowners, and abolished shipowner indemnity actions 
against the stevedore.”  Morton, supra note 11, at 102 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Bos., Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 266 (1st Cir. 1976) 
(defining “stevedore” as “a firm engaging directly in the unloading of vessels”). 
 41. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 73–74 (describing the new two-part status and 
situs test, which takes into account the type of work in which an employee engages 
and the place where the injury occurs); Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264–65 (explaining the 
change to a two-part situs-status test); New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of 
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (repeating 
that a claimant must establish both status—type of employee—and situs—location—
elements to be eligible for recovery); Morton, supra note 11, at 102–03 (explaining 
the expansion of the definition of “employee” and “navigable waters”).  
 42. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012) (situs requirement). 
 43. Id. § 902(3) (status requirement). 
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added a list of “statuses” or types of employment that did not qualify 
for coverage under the Act.44 
B. Circuit Split:  Approaches to the Situs Requirement 
In the wake of the 1972 amendments, longshoring cases began to 
rise through the circuits for adjudication, and varying approaches to 
the new situs and status requirements evolved, necessitating a 
Supreme Court pronouncement to unify the circuits.45  The Supreme 
Court thus ruled on a number of occasions that claimants must 
separately satisfy both the status and the situs requirement to qualify 
for benefits.46  Unfortunately, such “clarifications” did little to 
remediate the confusion, and courts continued to struggle with the 
specifics of how to interpret Congress’s revised statutory language, 
generally advocating for a liberal interpretation.47  However, in 
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,48 
the Supreme Court abolished the “true doubt rule,” determining that 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) should no longer give claimants 
the benefit of the doubt in close cases.49  Since then, certain 
Circuits—specifically the Fourth and Fifth Circuits—have stopped 
examining Congress’s purpose and intent when adjudicating cases, 
                                                          
 44. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 1639, 1639 (1984) (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)–(H)) (defining “employee,” by listing eight specific types of 
employees disqualified from coverage under the Act); Dulude & Greenwood, supra 
note 11, at 55–56 (elaborating on Congress’s 1984 response to confusion over the 
1972 amendments and noting that “the vocations [excluded from coverage] 
predominately included those in which workers were engaged in nontraditional 
occupations associated with burgeoning coastal development”).   
 45. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1985) (revisiting the two 
part status and situs test); P. C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 74 (asserting the use of the two 
part status and situs test and referring to the requirements as “distinct”); Caputo, 432 
U.S. at 264–65 (delving into the two part status and situs test requirements).  
 46. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 415–16; P. C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 74; Caputo, 432 
U.S. at 264–65; see, e.g., New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 389 (distinguishing situs 
from status as independent elements that a claimant must demonstrate to recover). 
 47. See Clark, supra note 11, at 857–58 (describing the various expansive 
interpretations that the Fifth Circuit has given to the Act, such as the decision in 
Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), which disfavored a strict 
technical interpretation of the LWHCA).   
 48. 512 U.S. 267 (1994).  
 49. Id. at 281 (ruling that the Department of Labor’s “true doubt rule,” which 
placed the burden of persuasion on the party opposing the benefits claim, was 
contrary to § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which stated that when the 
evidence is evenly balanced the claimant loses); see also Fitzhugh, supra note 3, at 266 
(observing that Greenwich Collieries turned on plain-language analysis and positing that 
this, too, had an impact on the Fourth Circuit’s shift to an overly restrictive approach). 
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taking a narrower approach to coverage that potentially deprives 
injured parties of much-needed compensation for their injuries.50 
1. 1972–1995:  An initially broad interpretation of the situs requirement 
Courts initially interpreted the statute broadly, especially vis-à-vis 
the situs requirement.  For example, in the 1976 decision Sea-Land 
Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,51 the 
Third Circuit concluded that a truck driver employed by an 
intermodal freight carrier was on a qualifying situs when he sustained 
injuries in a trucking accident that occurred on a public street near 
the port.52  The court stated that the statute’s list of covered areas did 
not constitute an exclusive list.53  Furthermore, it discarded the situs 
requirement as unnecessary in cases where the employee’s 
employment maintained a “nexus” to maritime employment, 
implying that the situs requirement does not matter if an employee 
meets the status requirement.54  The Court claimed that to hold 
otherwise would interfere with Congress’s intent to avoid shifting 
coverage for employees who meet the status requirement.55  
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether the claimant satisfied the Act’s status requirement.56 
Just a year later, the Supreme Court decided Northeast Marine 
Terminal Co. v. Caputo,57 which clarified questions over the situs test 
and specifically indicated that what used to be a strict “situs” test was 
now a two-part “situs” and “status” test.58  It paid close attention in its 
analysis to Congress’s intent59 and rejected as overly restrictive the 
point-of-rest theory, which suggests that a longshoreman’s coverage 
ends once he has removed the cargo from a ship and placed it 
somewhere on the pier or adjoining area—its point of rest.60  The 
Court paid particular attention to the fact that such a theory would 
exacerbate the problem of shifting coverage, which the 1972 
                                                          
 50. See infra notes 85, 111 and accompanying text (describing Fourth and Fifth 
Circuit decisions that limited coverage along with a plaintiff’s ability to recover 
for an injury). 
 51. 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 52. Id. at 632, 639.  
 53. Id. at 638.  
 54. See id. (suggesting that the situs of the maritime vessel, not that of the 
employee, be the determinative situs).  The use of situs to limit coverage for an 
employee who has already established status exacerbates the problem of shifting 
coverage for affected employees, a result that Congress wanted to avoid.  Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 640. 
 57. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).  
 58. Id. at 264–65.  
 59. Id. at 269–70.  
 60. Id. at 274–76.  
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amendments aimed to cure.61  Instead, the Court found the claimant 
eligible for LHWCA coverage for an injury that he sustained after he 
slipped on ice at the pier while checking a cargo container that 
arrived over land from a different pier.62  However, the Court refused 
to dismiss the situs requirement entirely, suggesting that the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation in Sea-Land left something to be desired.63  It 
reaffirmed the Caputo decision in P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford,64 which 
focused on maritime employment status, rather than on situs.65  In 
P.C. Pfeiffer, the Court revisited Caputo’s analysis of legislative intent, 
paying particular attention to the remedial nature of the Act.66 
In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit also took a liberal approach to 
coverage, though it refused to discard the situs requirement in its 
entirety following the Supreme Court’s Caputo decision.  In its 1978 
decision, Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron,67 the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that the claimant, Herron, met the status and situs 
requirements and was therefore eligible for coverage.68  Herron’s job 
at a gear locker involved a number of duties, some of which required 
him to transport items to the pier and perform work on board ships.69  
While unloading steel plates at the gear locker, he sustained injury.70  
The court explained that 
the phrase “adjoining area” should be read to describe a functional 
relationship that does not in all cases depend upon physical contiguity.  
Consideration should be given to the following factors, among 
others[:] . . . the particular suitability of the site for the maritime 
uses referred to in the statute; whether adjoining properties are 
devoted primarily to uses in maritime commerce; the proximity of 
the site to the waterway; and whether the site is as close to the 
waterway as is feasible given all of the circumstances in the case.71 
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit followed a similar approach in Texports 
Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, when it elected to employ a totality-of-the-
circumstances test to determine whether a situs qualified for coverage 
                                                          
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 253, 281.  
 63. Id. at 264–65, 278 n.40.  
 64. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 73 (1979) (affirming the two-part 
situs and status test). 
 65. Id. at 71.  
 66. See id. at 74–75 (noting the remedial intent behind the expansion of coverage 
in the 1972 Act). 
 67. 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 68. Id. at 141.   
 69. Id. at 139.   
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 141.  
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under the Act.72  Based on its own precedent, it rejected physical 
distance from the shore as decisive and determined that Winchester, 
a longshoreman employed in Texports’ gear rooms, qualified for 
LHWCA coverage when he tripped over a forklift in the gear room 
and disfigured his face.73  In particular, the Fifth Circuit emphasized 
Congress’s intent in enacting the 1972 amendments, as have many 
other LHWCA cases.74  Although Winchester’s injury took place in a 
gear room five blocks from the nearest dock, the gear room itself 
bore enough of a functional nexus to longshoring tasks that the court 
ruled that Winchester should receive compensation.75  The court also 
discussed the definition of “area,” which it found to support a 
broader reading of the statute.76  Though it acknowledged concerns 
that “area” might be extended to include downtown Houston, the 
court concluded that “to sweep that widely would be absurd.”77  It 
added that the “perimeter of an area is defined by function” and 
must have “some nexus with the waterfront.”78 
Thus, in the years directly following passage of the 1972 
amendments, courts focused primarily on Congress’s remedial intent 
and downplayed the importance of the situs requirement to 
effectuate significantly broader coverage for longshoremen who fell 
victim to the hazards of their employment.79  Following the “true 
doubt rule,” ALJs gave claimants the benefit of the doubt when 
evidence was equally balanced, essentially placing the burden of 
                                                          
 72. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 512–15 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en banc), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of 
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 73. Id. at 506–07, 511–13 (citing cases for their analyses of “other adjoining 
areas”).  Gear rooms store the equipment that longshoremen use for loading and 
unloading ships; Winchester’s tasks took him from the gear room to the docks and 
aboard ships.  Id. at 506–07 & n.1.   
 74. Id. at 510–11, 513, 516 (emphasizing that courts should reject a rule that 
would frustrate Congress’s goal of uniformity); see, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. 
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 261–65 (1977) (examining the Senate and House reports and 
detailing Congress’s development of the 1972 amendments); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 633–34 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(deducing Congress’s intent from the history of the Act); Stockman v. John T. Clark 
& Son of Bos., Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 274–75 (1st Cir. 1976) (turning to the legislative 
history to find a desire for uniform compensation, a wish to extend the Act to cover 
otherwise ineligible longshoremen, and a concern that modern cargo handling 
techniques might preclude coverage for some employees without such amendments).  
 75. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 506–07, 515 (defining the Act’s limitation on recovery 
as the functional character of an area and finding that the gear room was a function 
within the limits of longshoring). 
 76. Id. at 514–15.   
 77. Id. at 515. 
 78. Id. at 514–15. 
 79. Supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
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persuasion on the party opposing the claim.80  If a case did reach the 
circuit courts, injured claimants could trust that courts would look to 
the totality of the circumstances and favor much-needed coverage 
unless patently unreasonable.81  However, in 1994, the Supreme 
Court abolished the “true doubt rule,” deeming it inconsistent with 
Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act.82  With this 
development, certain circuit courts also took a step back, chipping 
away at coverage for injured workers.83 
2. 1994–Present:  Narrowing the situs requirement 
Despite years of case law supporting a liberal interpretation of the 
LHWCA, in 1995, courts began to interpret the statute more 
narrowly, particularly with regard to the situs requirement.  The 
Fourth Circuit initiated this trend in Sidwell v. Express Container 
Services, Inc.,84 when it ruled that a situs must literally adjoin navigable 
waters; mere proximity was insufficient to establish coverage.85  
Therefore, the plaintiff’s injury, which occurred as he repaired a 
shipping container at a location 0.8 miles from shore, did not qualify 
for LHWCA coverage.86  The opinion criticized Winchester, Sea-Land, 
and Herron for rejecting the LHWCA’s statutory language and, in the 
case of Sea-Land, for abolishing the situs requirement entirely.87  The 
Fourth Circuit therefore refused to adopt any other circuit’s test, 
charting its own “plain-language” course.88  It searched dictionaries 
for the meaning of “adjoining” and found both “neighboring” and 
“in the vicinity of” as possible definitions.89  However, the court 
determined that these were not among the ordinary meanings of 
                                                          
 80. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 
267, 269 (1994). 
 81. Supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
 82. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 280–81 (observing that the “true doubt rule” 
would defer to the judgment of each agency, whereas the APA required uniformity and 
standardization); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).  
 83. Infra text accompanying notes 98–103.  
 84. 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 85. Id. at 1138–39.   
 86. Id. at 1135 (indicating that the plaintiff had already received compensation 
under the state workers’ compensation scheme but wanted additional compensation 
under LHWCA).  
 87. Id. at 1136–37 (claiming that the Herron factors do not really address whether 
a site adjoins navigable waters and asserting that Winchester’s “broad and nebulous” 
approach, like the Sea-Land holding, utterly eviscerates the situs requirement 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 88. Id. at 1138. 
 89. Id.  
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“adjoining.”90  The court did not elaborate on how it ascertained the 
“ordinary meaning,” which suggests that it likely applied its own 
preferences.  Sidwell also noted the potential applicability of the 
canon of construction noscitur a sociis, which requires courts to look at 
the words surrounding “adjoining” to derive its meaning.91 
In its analysis, the court referred to the legislative history simply to 
prove that the legislative history supported the court’s own view, 
stating that the Act covers longshore-related injuries “occurring in 
the contiguous dock area.”92  However, the court supposedly did not 
use the legislative history to help it choose between the possible plain 
meanings evidenced in the dictionary,93 which still leaves the reader 
wondering why it dismissed certain definitions but not others.94  The 
court also neglected the fact that “contiguous,” like “adjoining,” can 
simply mean “nearby [or] close” according to a dictionary 
definition.95  Interestingly, the concurring opinion agreed only with 
the result and believed that the Herron test96 should apply to 
determine whether the injury occurred on a qualifying situs.97 
Based on the Sidwell decision, the Fourth Circuit subsequently 
denied other workers coverage.98  For example, in Parker v. Director, 
                                                          
 90. Id. (noting that the “ordinary meaning” of “adjoin” can signify “to lie next to,” 
to “be in contact with,” to “abut upon,” or to be “touching or bounding at some point,” 
but asserting that “adjoin” does not ordinarily mean “neighboring” or “in the vicinity of”).  
 91. Id. at 1139.  
 92. Id. at 1138 (emphasis in original) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 2).  
 93. See id. (asserting that the Fourth Circuit would gladly heed Congress’s intent 
if demonstrated within its statutory text and referring to the legislative history only in 
confirmation of the court’s analysis).   
 94. Cf. Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative 
History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8–9 
(1996) (noting that a court’s reliance on legislative history can be limited by strict 
adherence to the “plain meaning” rule).  
 95. WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 492. More to the point, a narrow 
interpretation of “contiguous” as “next to” would still contradict the other portions 
of the House and Senate Reports further describing Congress’s intent.  See S. REP. 
NO. 92-1125, at 2, 12–13 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (1972) (both for 
additional context on legislative intent); infra text accompanying notes 213–18 
(further analyzing the court’s view on the word “contiguous” in the context of the 
plain meaning of “adjoining”). 
 96. The Herron test requires that the area bear a “functional relationship” to the 
maritime uses referenced in the Act and considers certain factors.  Supra text 
accompanying notes 68–71. 
 97. See Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1142 (Beaty, J., concurring) (explaining that the test 
“provides a sufficient mechanism to resolve, on a case by case basis, situs issues 
raised by [the Act]”).  
 98. See, e.g., Walker v. Metro Mach. Corp., 50 F. App’x 104, 105, 107 (4th Cir. 
2002) (refusing coverage to a ship repairman whose work did not regularly take him 
to the water’s edge); Parker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 75 F.3d 929, 
933 (4th Cir. 1996) (spurning every reasonable explanation for the company’s 
expansion inland when analyzing the situs requirement).   
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Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,99 an inspector and a container 
mechanic sustained injuries in the course of their employment at 
Farrell Lines, Inc.100  The container repair company’s expansion had 
forced it to transfer most of its operations from its small portside 
facility to a larger facility, located five miles from shore.101  Even 
though employees transferred between the two locations, and despite 
the company’s inability to find an equally suitable location closer to 
shore, the court denied the men coverage, claiming that the facility 
failed the situs test because it did not abut navigable waters.102  Under 
this test, harbor workers particularly suffer because much of their 
work repairing ships and manufacturing parts now takes place further 
inland at facilities near but not adjacent to “navigable waters,” 
thereby precluding coverage.103 
Around the same time, the Third Circuit, narrowing its approach 
after the Caputo decision, began to apply the situs test, though still in 
a liberal fashion.  In 1998, for example, it applied the Herron test104 to 
Nelson v. American Dredging Co.105 and determined that the claimant’s 
injury took place on a qualifying situs.106  In doing so, the court 
referred to Sidwell’s analysis and determined that, as in the Sidwell 
decision, it must investigate the plain meaning of the statute.107  
However, using the same dictionary as the Sidwell court, the Third 
Circuit judges came to a different conclusion and rejected the Sidwell 
construction of the LHWCA statutory language.108  Additionally, the 
Third Circuit declined to apply the canon noscitur a sociis in the 
manner that the Fourth Circuit did, viewing the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation as contrary to both the plain language of the LHWCA 
                                                          
 99. 75 F.3d 929 (4th Cir. 1996).   
 100. Id. at 931.   
 101. Id. at 931–32.   
 102. Id. at 933 (asserting that the relevant inquiry is whether the injury occurred 
in an area that qualifies as a maritime situs under the LHWCA). 
 103. See Jonathan Corp. v. Brickhouse, 142 F.3d 217, 220, 222 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(determining that a facility located 1000 feet from a river and whose property 
extended to the water’s edge was not an “adjoining area” because the facility itself 
did not abut the shore:  “the employees’ work did not routinely take them from 
within the plant, onto adjoining water, and back again into the plant,” as a 
longshoreman’s work would, and the property’s contiguity to navigable waters was 
“simply fortuitous”).   
 104. Supra text accompanying note 71. 
 105. 143 F.3d 789 (3rd Cir. 1998).   
 106. Id. at 795–97 (agreeing that Herron was the appropriate standard to apply to 
an injury that occurred in a beach area but disputing the ALJ’s and the Board’s 
application of that standard to the facts).   
 107. Id. at 797.  
 108. Id. (rejecting a broad definition of “area” and explaining that the court is 
required to cease its inquiry into the meaning of specific language if the language is 
plain and unambiguous).  
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and to Congress’s goals in enacting the statute.109  Thus, the Third 
Circuit afforded coverage to the claimant while also narrowing its 
approach to LHWCA statutory construction. 
Nearly twenty years after the Sidwell decision, the Fifth Circuit 
abandoned its former approach in Winchester and adopted a plain-
language approach to the LHWCA mirroring that of the Fourth 
Circuit.  In New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker’s 
Compensation Programs,110 the court adopted the Sidwell plain-meaning 
definition of “adjoining” to mean “border on” or “contiguous with,” 
so the claimant failed to meet the situs requirement.111  It deemed a 
contextual approach unworkable, with particular reference to 
Winchester’s focus on “the circumstances” of the case.112  Yet other 
courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have listed concrete factors to assess 
and consistently succeed in applying that approach.113  As a result of 
this new approach, the Fifth Circuit determined that a company located 
300 yards from shore with a bottling plant between the company and 
the shore did not constitute a qualifying situs, even though the 
plaintiff’s job entailed “repair, maintenance, and storage of shipping 
containers and chassis,” some of which transport ocean cargo.114 
The narrower interpretations championed over the last two 
decades cannot but limit coverage for maritime workers.115  This 
reality contravenes Congress’s intent to afford broad coverage and, 
more importantly, deprives workers of benefits based solely on an 
erroneously narrow and arbitrary approach to statutory interpretation.116  
While only the Fourth and Fifth Circuits currently follow such an 
extreme approach, the Fifth Circuit was historically the “principal 
maritime circuit” of the United States.117  As such, its decision may 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 797–98 (rejecting as too narrow a construction of the Act that would 
only cover injuries that occurred on certain definable structures and claiming that 
such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the broader construction that 
Congress intended).  
 110. 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 111. Id. at 393–94.   
 112. Id. at 390 (lamenting that the court in Winchester offered little guidance on 
which circumstances are required for a claimant to satisfy the situs test).  
 113. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(including “the particular suitability of the site for the maritime uses referred to in 
the statute; whether adjoining properties are devoted primarily to uses in maritime 
commerce; the proximity of the site to the waterway; and whether the site is as close 
to the waterway as is feasible given all of the circumstances in the case”).  
 114. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 386–87.  
 115. Supra text accompanying notes 111–14. 
 116. See Nelson v. Am. Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(contending that an expansive rather than a narrow view of the Act is more 
consistent with Congress’s intent based on its use of broad language). 
 117. See Bue, supra note 28, at 350 (acclaiming the Fifth Circuit’s broad sweep and 
the array of unique issues it deals with, despite a heavily burdened docket); Dulude & 
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prompt a shift in opinion among the courts, leading other circuits to 
abandon broad coverage as the circumstances of the LHWCA 
enactments fade into the annals of history.  At the very least, claimants 
employed within the Fourth and Fifth Circuits can expect limited 
benefits based on the sheer misfortune of their geographic location. 
C. Statutory Interpretation and the Canons of Construction 
Clarifying precisely how the Fourth and Fifth Circuit 
interpretations err requires turning to the language of the statute 
and traditional tools of statutory interpretation.  Thus, the next 
section will furnish background knowledge on theories of statutory 
construction and the most pertinent canons of construction, thereby 
providing a framework for the statutory analysis in Part II. 
1. Theories of statutory interpretation 
Over the years, a variety of theories and techniques of statutory 
interpretation have developed in the United States, but three primary 
theories prevail:  intent-based, textual, and hybrid.118  Naturally, 
intent-based theories inquire into Congress’s intent, frequently 
relying on some combination of legislative history sources and 
investigation into the social, political, and historical context of the 
law’s enactment.119  Textualist approaches, on the other hand, posit 
that judges should focus exclusively on the text and apply the 
                                                          
Greenwood, supra note 11, at 62, 77–78 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit is the 
“principal maritime circuit” based on the sheer quantity of maritime decisions it 
makes and the fact that, as of 2010, the Fifth Circuit is “the site of the lion’s share of 
the nation’s maritime labor”).  This status dates back to before the creation of the 
Eleventh Circuit, when the Fifth Circuit extended from Texas to Florida, covering 
the entire Gulf area, and its jurisdiction basically included all maritime cases arising 
along the southern border of the United States.  Bue, supra note 28, at 350. 
 118. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
219 (2d ed. 2006).  Others theories of statutory interpretation are often subsets or 
offshoots of intentionalism or textualism; they include purposivism (statutes should 
be construed according to their purpose), originalism (statutory terms retain the 
meaning they had when Congress enacted the text), and pragmatism (“statutes 
should be construed to produce sensible, desirable results, since that is what the 
legislature must have intended”). Id. at 228–30; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18–22, 78 (2012) (railing against 
purposivism and pragmatism and explaining the rationale behind originalism); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 426 
(1989) (debating the strengths and weaknesses of purposivism).  Although the terms 
“intentionalist” and “textualist” typically describe opposite ends of a spectrum of 
interpretation preferences, many judges will fall closer to the middle of the 
spectrum.  Thus, this Comment uses the terms very generally to denote judges’ broad 
preferences, rather than ends of a polar spectrum.   
 119. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 219–20 (emphasizing that a methodological 
conflict over proper statutory interpretation exists among the three approaches as 
well as within each individual approach).  
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statute’s “plain meaning” when possible because the text either 
specifically evidences Congress’s intent or simply provides the only 
decisive interpretive authority.120  In doing so, textualists often reject 
recourse to legislative history or socio-historical indicators, preferring 
instead text-linked sources, like dictionaries, grammar books, other 
parts of the statute, and interpretations of similar provisions in 
comparable statutes.121  A hybrid approach would combine the 
intentionalist and textualist approaches, hopefully gleaning the best 
of both for a “more dynamic, pragmatic assessment of institutional, 
textual, and contextual factors.”122 
Regardless of which theory a judge espouses, his inquiry will almost 
invariably begin by contemplating the text of the statute itself.123  In 
addition to reviewing the text and the applicable precedent, he may 
apply any number of canons of construction to reach a conclusion, 
and he may also research Congress’s specific intent regarding scope 
and application of the law, its purpose in enacting the statute, and 
the evolution and historical context of the statute, among other 
options.124  Although some argue that congressional intent is not 
discoverable, lawmaking presupposes a method for making known to 
the courts the intent of the lawmakers, and inquiry into legislative 
intent derives from this concept that courts must have a way to 
understand and apply legislators’ work.125  Legal scholar James M. 
Landis asserts that such intent is discoverable, stating that “[t]o insist 
that each individual legislator besides his aye vote must also have 
expressed the meaning he attaches to the bill” would be to ignore 
that each vote builds on what was previously said, indicating 
agreement with the statements and interpretations already expressed 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 231; Sunstein, supra note 118, at 416 (drawing attention to the fact that 
only statutory terms have undergone the constitutional procedures for enacting law, 
meaning that legislative history and other tools have no actual authority or force of law).  
 121. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 236.  
 122. Id. at 219.  
 123. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) (remarking that the 
Court’s exclusive task was to determine Congress’s intent in enacting the statute, a 
task that naturally begins by reference to the statutory text); SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 118, at 16 (stating that textualism “begins and ends” with the text and its 
reasonable implications).   
 124. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 250, 257 (diagramming the customary way in 
which statutory interpretation has proceeded for the last century, with judges starting 
from the most concrete (textual) sources and gradually expanding the source field as 
needed to guide interpretation); see also James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory 
Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 892–93 (1930) (explaining that interpretive rules 
do not automatically bear results but rather attune the interpreter’s mind to the 
legislature’s vision). 
 125. See Landis, supra note 124, at 886 (recognizing that although such a concept 
has caused some judges to invent inaccurate legislative intents to effectively “legislate” 
their own preferences, the occasional abuse does not invalidate the concept).  
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in the record.126  However, textualists would likely respond that the 
intent—if it is even pertinent—should be discoverable from the text 
of the statute itself.127 
2. Techniques of statutory interpretation:  Canons of construction 
For those judges hesitant to rely on legislative and historical 
sources, the canons of construction provide a variety of techniques, 
both textual and substantive, to guide logical interpretation of 
statutes.  Of course, those concerned that “citing legislative history 
is . . . akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends’” 
could target the same criticism toward the canons of construction, 
which, though based in text and logic, often lead to contradictory 
interpretations depending on which canon is selected.128  However, 
Professor William Eskridge believes that textual sources settle most 
simple issues.129  Though the more difficult cases may result in a 
confrontation between theories of interpretation and preferred 
sources, the canons of construction provide a framework that most 
judges draw from when interpreting statutory texts.130  This section will 
examine some of the most time-tested canons and apply them to the 
LHWCA below to explain that a broad interpretation of the LHWCA 
is more appropriate in determining coverage for injured workers. 
a. Canon I:  Plain meaning canon 
This canon typically requires judges to give words “the meaning an 
ordinary speaker of the English language would draw from the 
statutory text,”131 unless the statute indicates that the words bear a 
                                                          
 126. Id. at 888–89.   
 127. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824) (“[T]he enlightened 
patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be 
understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what 
they have said.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 70 (implying that legislators do 
intend a particular use of a word, which can often be discovered through context).  
 128. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950) 
(listing twenty-eight pairs of common but contradicting canons); Patricia M. Wald, 
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA 
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing a conversation between herself and Harold Levanthal).   
 129. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 257.  
 130. See Wald, supra note 128, at 206–07 (observing the Supreme Court’s emphasis 
on using canons and noting that historically, judges accustomed to common law 
interpretation drafted canons of construction and general principles to assist them in 
interpreting difficult statutory language). 
 131. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 236.  Who is an “ordinary,” “everyday” speaker of 
English anyway?  In 2004, David Crystal asserted that second-language speakers of 
English currently equal native speakers in quantity and will inevitably outnumber 
first-language speakers in the future due to the relatively huge population growth in 
areas where English is a second language.  DAVID CRYSTAL, THE LANGUAGE 
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technical meaning.132  Though one of the most ubiquitous and 
fundamental canons,133 it often overlooks and oversimplifies the 
intrinsic complexity of language.134  Essentially, this rule forbids the 
use of extra-textual sources when the statute is unambiguous.135  
However, plain meaning can prove more elusive than this rule 
implies because a determination of a word’s ordinary or general 
meaning inevitably involves a judge’s discernment, often guided by 
other canons of construction or by historical and legislative sources.136  
Although the proverbial sign “No vehicles in the park” will be easy to 
interpret as to cars, buses, motorcycles, and the like, application of 
                                                          
REVOLUTION 8 (2004).  These statistics do not even include foreign-language learners 
of English.  Id. at 8–9.  By “ordinary” or “everyday” meaning, do judges presume a 
white, educated, native-English-speaking, American male?  At which identities do 
judges draw the line?  According to Scalia, “[w]hat the rule presumes is that a 
thoroughly fluent reader can reliably tell in the vast majority of instances from 
contextual and idiomatic clues which of several possible senses a word or phrase bears,” 
but this only answers the question part way.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 70.   
 132. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 69.  
 133. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824) (assuming early in 
our country’s history that words must carry their “natural sense”); SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 118, at 69 (calling this rule “the most fundamental semantic rule of 
interpretation”); NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2014) (giving an overview of the plain meaning rule 
and referencing hundreds of federal and state cases that discuss or employ the plain 
meaning rule); Llewellyn, supra note 128, at 403 (listing the plain meaning canon 
among other examples of common canons).   
 134. Interestingly, language usage differs far more than one might think, both 
between native speakers from different countries and between native and second-
language speakers of English. In Indian English, for example, “let’s make a move” 
simply means “let’s go,” whereas an American hearing the same phrase might assume 
that the speaker wanted to seduce another person.  LONELY PLANET, INDIAN ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 38 (2008).  Less confusing would be the native British 
English and American English uses of words like “bathroom” and “pants.”  In the 
United Kingdom, a bathroom is very clearly a room that contains a bath (or at least a 
shower) within it, and “pants” refer to underpants, not a pair of khakis, jeans, or 
trousers.  Mike Etherington & Sarah Etherington, Around the House, THE VERY BEST OF 
BRITISH, http://effingpot.com/house.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2014); Mike 
Etherington & Sarah Etherington, Clothing, THE VERY BEST OF BRITISH, 
http://effingpot.com/clothing.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).  Even within the 
United States, there are differences:  does “soda” mean fizzy water?  Or does it mean 
Coca-Cola and similar fountain beverages?  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY, 1115 (Frederick C. Mish et al., eds., 10th ed. 1995) (defining soda as 
“2a:  SODA WATER b:  SODA POP c:  a sweet drink consisting of soda water, 
flavoring, and often ice cream”). 
 135. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754–55 
(2010) (examining several state supreme court interpretive frameworks and 
advocating for the “methodological stare decisis,” practiced among some of them, 
which dictates application of particular techniques in state statutory interpretation).   
 136. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 233 (questioning whether one can 
confidently deduce the plain meaning of a statute without examining legislative 
deliberations and the statute’s practical consequences); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
118, at 70 (noting the role that context plays in statutory interpretation, a theory 
exemplified in Canons III–V infra); see Sunstein, supra note 120, at 416–17 (explaining 
that interpretation is necessary to infer the precise meaning of statutory terms).   
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the plain meaning canon may result in ambiguous or even unwanted 
results concerning tricycles (and perhaps bicycles) in the park without 
consideration of sources beyond the rule’s stated language.137 
Though Justice Antonin Scalia notes that common experience 
shows that “[i]n everyday life, the people to whom rules are 
addressed continually understand and apply them,” cases that 
actually come to trial hardly represent the typical cases of everyday 
life.138  In fact, the argument often revolves around one or two select 
words from the statutory text.139  By the time a case comes to trial, the 
plain meaning rule may not generate easy answers without help from 
other canons or outside sources.  And though judges may use a 
dictionary or other tools to aid their interpretation, some dictionary 
definitions are “quite abstruse and rarely intended,” leaving judges of 
difficult cases right where they started.140  In other words, a case that 
comes to trial likely involves some degree of ambiguity, rendering the 
plain meaning rule superfluous.141 
b. Canon II:  The whole act rule 
Essentially, the universally-followed whole act rule maintains that 
courts should take a macroscopic view of the text, construing it as a 
whole.142  This theory also provides the basis for a number of other 
canons, including Canons III-V infra, which elaborate on the idea that 
context is crucial to statutory interpretation.143  Specifically, certain 
parts of a statute provide context that potentially elucidates more 
                                                          
 137. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 257.  
 138. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 71.  Even among cases filed, those that 
come to trial are a small minority, less than two percent in federal civil cases and less 
than five percent in federal criminal cases.  Pat Vaughan Tremmel, Much Celebrated 
American Trial Is Dying in Real Life, NW. U. (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.northwestern. 
edu/newscenter/stories/2009/03/burnstrial.html.  
 139. See Nix v. Heddon, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1893) (examining whether “tomato” 
refers to a fruit or a vegetable); ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 257 (interpreting the 
word “vehicle” with regard to tricycles); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 74 
(illustrating the impact of interpreting the word “consideration” under its ordinary 
meaning versus its technical legal meaning); see also Frigaliment Importing Co. v. 
B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp. 190 F. Supp. 116, 117–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (debating how to 
construe the word “chicken” in a contract for the sale of goods and what interpretive 
sources would be appropriate).  
 140. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 70.  
 141. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 271–72 (debunking the assumption that a 
“single minded and omniscient” legislature writes statutes that provide clear and 
consistent meaning). 
 142. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 271 (noting that federal and state courts each 
follow this rule, which applies in both common law and civil law countries, as well); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 167. 
 143. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 168.  
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obscure portions of the same statute.144  Based on this canon, 
interpreters may presume that a given word is not used gratuitously 
but rather has a consistent meaning throughout the statutory text; 
interpretations that harmonize two potentially contradictory terms 
are preferable.145  However, Eskridge notes that this presumption may 
be faulty; the legislature hardly constitutes a single omniscient 
author, and the need to compromise sometimes results in 
duplications or omissions, as well as provisions that undermine each 
other.146  This subverts the further presumption that any intent will be 
evident on the face of the statute when viewed as a whole.147  
Alternatively, if the entirety of the statute does reveal a particular intent, 
this risks the tendency, which Scalia condemns, to eliminate readings 
of the statute that conflict with the overall intent of the statute; such a 
technique would correspond well with intentionalist goals.148  Merits 
debate aside, statutes anticipate and even require use of the whole act 
rule, if only by including a definitions section—as in the LHWCA—or 
by explicitly cross-referencing other provisions of a statute.149 
c. Canon III:  Noscitur a sociis 
Related to the whole act rule, the noscitur a sociis canon asserts that 
associated words “bear on one another’s meaning” and modify each 
other.150  Therefore, courts must examine surrounding words to 
derive meaning.151  The words generally must connect in such a way 
that they imply commonality, as with a list of terms.152  This canon 
proves particularly useful for elucidating otherwise ambiguous 
terms.153  For example, if a sign reads “No motorized vehicles in the 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 167–68 (explaining that the possible meaning of a word or phrase in a statute 
can be determined by examining the use of the same word elsewhere in the statute).   
 145. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 271; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 168.  
 146. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 271–72.  
 147. Id. (defending the whole act rules on the grounds that it provides the most 
objective method for ascertaining what the statute requires).   
 148. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 168.  
 149. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C § 902 (2012) (definitions sections).  See generally 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (providing an example of 
ubiquitous cross-references in a statute). 
 150. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 168, 195; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 
118, at 261 (explaining that this canon also leads to the conclusion that, in a group 
of related words, specific words will limit or qualify general terms).   
 151. See Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 
1995) (employing noscitur a sociis to the LHWCA situs provision and refusing to 
define words in the statute in isolation because to do so would be to ignore the 
statute’s “definitional limits”).   
 152. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 196–97 (adding, however, that “a listing 
is not [a] prerequisite”).  
 153. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2014) (asserting that neighboring words can 
more precisely define an ambiguous term).   
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park,” a person would naturally look to the term “motorized” to 
clarify which vehicles he could legally bring to the park.  
Grammatically, adjectives modify nouns, so “motorized” bears an 
appropriate relation to “vehicles” for this canon to apply.  Since 
neither a tricycle nor a bicycle has a motor, likely no one would 
question the use of either in the park. 
d. Canon IV:  Ejusdem generis 
The ejusdem generis canon elaborates on noscitur a sociis and states 
that when catchall terms, such as “other,” follow a list of specific 
items, interpreters should assume that such terms refer only to words 
that share characteristics with other items in the list.154  Thus, one 
could potentially assume that in the phrase “X, Y, Z, and other 
letters,” the terms “other letters” refers only to those letters that 
constitute the Latin alphabet.155  Ejusdem generis essentially “implies 
the addition of similar after the word other.”156  In the same vein, the 
phrase “B, Φ, 3, and other characters” would not include characters 
like Snoopy or Mickey Mouse.  Such a construction corresponds with 
the idea that context is essential to interpretation, but it also ensures 
that the enumeration is not superfluous, as it would be if “characters” 
were construed in the broadest terms possible.157  One downfall of 
this canon is its failure to identify the proper level of generality to use 
when interpreting a statute, which leaves judges with significant 
leeway.158  However, both this canon and the preceding two illustrate 
legislators’ understanding that people use lists to connect similar 
terms and concepts and to imbue them with additional meaning.159 
                                                          
 154. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 199 (“Where general words follow an 
enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same 
general kind or class specifically mentioned.”). 
 155. While such a statement could also support inclusion of letters from other 
alphabets, the whole act rule would clarify this; if the entirety of the text uses the 
Latin alphabet exclusively, there would be no cause to presume that “other letters” 
included letters of the Greek alphabet or the International Phonetic Alphabet, for 
example.  If the text were a linguistics article, however, such an assumption would 
potentially be unfounded, and a technical definition of “letter” might apply, 
excluding Japanese and Hindi syllabaries, as well as Chinese characters, from 
classification as letters.  See Simon Ager, Types of Writing System, OMNIGLOT, 
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/types.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).   
 156. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 199.  
 157. Id. at 199–200.  
 158. Id. at 207–08 (questioning whether an ordinance applying to owners of “horses, 
cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, and other farm animals” applies to any domestic animal one 
might find on a farm or whether the animal must be a mammal or a quadruped too).  
 159. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 262.  
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e. Canon V:  “Presumption of Nonexclusive ‘Include’”160 
Typically, use of the verb “include” or the gerund “including” 
suggests examples, rather than “an exhaustive list.”161  This runs 
counter to another common canon that presumes that the inclusion 
of one term implies the exclusion of terms not mentioned.162  
However, the presumption of the nonexclusivity of “include” stands 
as a common exception to the negative implication canon.163  This 
exception also corresponds with common usage; if a person goes 
grocery shopping and comes back with five full grocery bags, a child 
or spouse might ask what he bought at the store.  He might reply, “I 
bought a number of things, including chicken for dinner tonight, 
some mixed vegetables, and milk for your tea.”  In all likelihood, this 
is merely an illustrative list because the listed items would not fill five 
grocery bags.  Instead, the list provides the inquirer with useful 
information about items he requested or the content of future meals.  
For a full accounting, the shopper might as well just furnish the 
inquirer with the receipt for the inquirer to read himself. 
f. Canon VI:  Presumption against ineffectiveness 
Insofar as it is possible to discern the legislature’s intent, the 
presumption against ineffectiveness insists that judges favor a 
textually sound interpretation that furthers the statute’s purpose over 
a textually sound interpretation that hinders its purpose.164  Thus, 
this canon assumes that judges can and should look to the purpose of 
a statute.165  However, textualists would argue that one should discern 
such intent exclusively from the four corners of the document, not 
from outside research into legislative history.166  In contrast, 
intentionalists and those who take a hybrid approach would 
nonetheless look to sources outside the text to determine or confirm 
the text’s purpose.167 
The Emily & The Caroline,168 an 1824 Supreme Court case, offers one 
example of this canon in action.169  The statute prohibited the 
                                                          
 160. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 132.  
 161. Id.  
 162. This canon is known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 
118, at 263–64.  
 163. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 132–33.  
 164. Id. at 63.  
 165. See also id. at 63 (articulating that this canon stems from the fact that “(1) 
interpretation always depends on context, (2) context always includes evident 
purpose, and (3) evident purpose always includes effectiveness”).   
 166. Id. at 33.  
 167. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 219.   
 168. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824). 
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preparation of “any ship or vessel, within any port or place of the 
United States . . . for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in 
slaves.”170  The Supreme Court determined that the statute did not 
require completion of the preparations for the penalty of forfeiture to 
attach; such a requirement would defeat the purpose of the statute 
because completely prepared ships could immediately set sail, 
evading legal consequences.171  Thus, the Court excluded this 
ineffective interpretation of the law and determined that the statute 
must apply as soon as preparations manifest an intent to use the ships 
for the slave trade.172 
g. Canon VII:  Absurd results canon 
This canon allows judges to disregard or revise laws if failing to do 
so would result in an absurd, inconsistent, or thoroughly 
unreasonable result.173  However, Eskridge rightly asks, “What, then, 
is the difference between an absurd result (i.e., one the legislature 
certainly did not contemplate) and merely an unreasonable one (i.e., 
one the judge disagrees with and truly believes right-thinking people 
would find unreasonable)?”174  Because this distinction is difficult to 
maintain, textualists tend to conclude that this canon only applies to 
correct scrivener’s errors and other obvious mistakes, otherwise 
viewing the canon as a “slippery slope” toward judicial lawmaking.175  
Others, however, give the canon broader application, as in Church of 
the Holy Trinity v. United States.176  There, the Supreme Court applied 
the absurdity doctrine,177 stating 
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, 
nor within the intention of its makers . . . .  This is not the 
                                                          
 169. Id. at 388 (instructing legal professionals that in construing any statute, the 
focus must remain on the object in view, and the interpretation must never conflict 
with the statute’s purpose); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 63–64 (citing 
The Emily & The Caroline, along with a few other examples of this canon).   
 170. The Emily & The Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 385.  
 171. Id. at 388; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 63–64.  
 172. The Emily & The Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 389.  
 173. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 267; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 234.  
 174. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 268.  
 175. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 235–38 (elaborating that the 
correction must be simple—involving the addition or replacement of a word or 
phrase that the legislature obviously intended).   
 176. 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).  In that case, a law prevented people or companies 
from “assist[ing] or encourag[ing] the importation or migration of any alien . . . 
under contract or agreement . . . to perform labor or service of any kind . . . .”  Id. at 
458.  The Supreme Court largely felt that Congress could not possibly have intended 
this provision to apply to an English minister and overruled the lower court based on 
the absurdity doctrine.  Id. at 557–58. 
 177. See infra Part II.A.7.  
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substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for 
frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words 
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration 
of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such 
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that 
the legislator intended to include the particular act.178 
While such a statement is clearly open to abuse, even the majority 
in Church of the Holy Trinity aimed to give a statute only the meaning 
that the legislature intended.179  How to determine the legislature’s 
intent is an ongoing point of contention, but most people would 
agree that the absurdity doctrine still applies, even as they disagree 
over its scope of application.180 
h. Canon VIII:  Remedial statutes 
The “oft-expressed maxim” that remedial statutes should be 
liberally construed argues for a broader approach to statutory 
interpretation, lending primacy to the purpose or intent behind the 
law.181  Scalia, for one, attacks this notion as false and points to the 
difficulty in discerning which laws are remedial; in some sense, he 
reasons, all laws are remedial, as they all attempt to address a 
perceived problem in the nation’s legal framework.182  Yet courts have 
invoked this rule time and again, from Chisholm v. Georgia183 in 1793 
to the present day.184  Harvard professor David L. Shapiro suggests 
that this canon has had the greatest impact in areas where the 
legislature was taking restorative action to cure a problem with 
currently existing legislation or correcting prior blunders or where 
                                                          
 178. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.  
 179. See id. (reasoning that the act in question may have been within the scope of the 
statute, but Congress could not have envisioned application to this type of transaction).  
 180. See supra Part I.C.1 (detailing the intentionalist and textualist points of view 
on statutory interpretation).   
 181. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 935 (1992).   
 182. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 364–65 & n.6 (providing examples 
such as California’s Credit Card Act, Alabama’s Small Loan Act, and Washington, 
D.C.’s liquor control law).   
 183. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793).  
 184. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(advocating an “expansive” interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act in light of 
its “remedial purposes”); see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476 (declaring that 
because the extension of federal judicial power over the states serves a remedial 
purpose, it should be liberally construed).  But see Holland v. Williams Mountain 
Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dismissing this canon as useless 
because it “does nothing to identify which statutes should be ‘liberally construed’”).  
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the change hoped to increase access to certain benefits without 
stripping them from current beneficiaries.185 
II. ANALYSIS 
This section applies the conventional interpretive devices to the 
LHWCA and its corresponding case law to understand why a broader 
approach to coverage for injured marine employees better 
corresponds with both the statutory text and Congress’s intent.  
Before doing so, however, it is worth noting that circuit courts review 
Benefits Review Board decisions de novo—without reference to 
Chevron deference186—because the language of § 903(a) does not 
involve a special agency interpretation and therefore does not fall 
under the Chevron rubric.187  Despite this, courts tend to look first to 
the statute’s “plain meaning,” as in Sidwell and New Orleans Depot 
Services, paralleling the Court’s directive in Chevron to determine 
whether Congress’s language speaks clearly to the issue at hand.188  
                                                          
 185. See Shapiro, supra note 181, at 938.  
 186. Special considerations apply when courts review the interpretations of 
administrative agencies because administrative agencies often formulate their own 
rules, either upon Congress’s directive or out of necessity to supplement the rules 
that Congress provides.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  Chevron, the seminal case in this area, established a 
two-part test to apply when a court reviews a statute.  Id. at 842.  First, the court must 
determine whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue.  Id.  If congressional 
intent is evident, the analysis ends, and both the court and the agency must respect 
Congress’s intent.  Id. at 842–43.  However, if the statutory language is unclear, the 
court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable.  Id. at 843.  Under Chevron deference, courts must look to Congress’s 
intent, and the canons of construction often guide that inquiry.  See id. at 843 & n.9 
(“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law 
and must be given effect.”  (citations omitted)).  However, if after applying the 
canons and perhaps looking into legislative history and other such sources, 
Congress’s intent remains ambiguous, courts must defer to the administrative 
agency’s interpretation unless the interpretation is patently unreasonable.  See 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 328–29 (indicating that the Supreme Court has only 
twice overturned an agency decision based on Chevron’s reasonableness prong).   
 187. See New Orleans Depot Servs,. Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (determining that because 
the facts were not in dispute, the case presented an issue of statutory construction 
and legislative intent and should be reviewed de novo); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842–43 (listing the two inquiries in judicial review of an agency interpretation—
unambiguity of Congress’s language and reasonableness of the interpretation); 
Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1141–42 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(claiming that the one-page internal memorandum presented by the Director of the 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs likely did not qualify as an “actual 
agency interpretation” and therefore would be worthy of less deference anyway, 
especially given the lack of legal analysis; rather, the memorandum simply affirmed 
the Fifth’s Circuit’s decision in Winchester). 
 188. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (requiring courts to discern and apply 
Congress’s clearly-stated intent when possible); New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 
391–93 (scrutinizing the approaches in other circuits with particular emphasis on the 
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However, lately courts have mistakenly determined that Congress’s 
language speaks unambiguously in favor of a restrictive statutory 
construction that limits benefits for injured workers.189 
A. Applying the Canons of Construction 
Whether courts favor a broad or a narrow interpretation, they 
typically begin with the most textually-based canons and sources to 
interpret a statute; from there, some stop after reviewing the four 
corners of the text, while others quickly expand their inquiry to 
external sources.190  There is a certain logical coherence to looking at 
the statutory text before investigating other sources because 
determining and applying a statute’s purpose without first looking at 
the statutory language could result in egregious judicial 
overreaching.191  This Comment will therefore proceed to apply the 
canons discussed in Part I.C.2 supra to the LHWCA’s contested 
language, starting with the most text-oriented canons. 
1. Canon I:  Plain meaning canon 
Because intentionalists and textualists alike begin with the statutory 
text, few would debate the wisdom of assessing the ordinary meaning 
of the words in a statute.192  The New Orleans Depot Services en banc 
decision turned on the definition of “adjoining” and its 
ambiguities.193  However, the entire statutory provision lacks clarity; 
it revolves around the definition of “navigable waters,” a facially 
unclear and ambiguous concept in the statute.194  Under any ordinary 
                                                          
Fourth Circuit’s plain meaning approach); Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138 (analyzing the 
plain language as a means to discern Congress’s stated intent). 
 189. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 393–94; Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1141.  
 190. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 250 (diagramming the statutory inquiry 
process, from the most concrete inquiry, involving the statutory text, to more abstract 
inquiries, involving legislative purpose and current values); see also id. at 317 
(depicting the authoritativeness of legislative history sources).  For a case that follows 
this approach, see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).  
 191. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 16 (arguing that beginning with the 
text does not necessarily mean that the inquiry ends there; instead, non-textual 
approaches are often subsequently and inappropriately applied).  
 192. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118 at 69. 
 193. The statutory text reads: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, compensation shall be payable 
under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only 
if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable 
waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, 
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily 
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or 
building a vessel).  
 LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012).   
 194. See id.  Incidentally, ambiguity around the term “navigable waters” also 
beleaguers the Clean Water Act, which defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of 
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definition, a “pier, wharf, dry dock, [etc.]” could not constitute 
“navigable waters” because they are neither water nor navigable, 
and yet, the statute nonetheless includes them in its definition of 
“navigable waters,” rendering the plain meaning of “navigable waters” 
inapplicable under the statute.195  This context implies that the 
“ordinary meaning” does not consistently apply to this statute and 
raises concern over the pertinence of this canon across all terms in 
the statute. 
Assuming that the ordinary meaning of “adjoining” applied here, 
that meaning would likely comprise definitions like “attached to,” 
“next to,” “near,” or something similar.196  The Sidwell court 
determined that Congress did not assign “adjoining” a technical 
meaning, so courts must discern its “ordinary meaning.”197  It further 
asserted that 
dictionaries do include “neighboring” and “in the vicinity of” as 
possible definitions of “adjoining,” but such is not the ordinary 
meaning of the word; rather, the ordinary meaning of “adjoin” is 
“to lie next to,” to “be in contact with,” to “abut upon,” or to be 
“touching or bounding at some point,” 
a view that the New Orleans Depot Services court endorsed.198  Until the 
New Orleans Depot Services decision, however, Winchester ruled in the 
Fifth Circuit and emphasized that “adjoining” could mean “close to,” 
“near,” or “neighboring.”199  The Winchester court saw no reason to 
                                                          
the United States.”  Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 (Clean 
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012); see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
731, 734, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that the term “navigable 
waters” is far broader under the Clean Water Act than under the traditional 
definition, where “navigable waters” must be “navigable in fact or susceptible of 
being rendered so,” and elaborating that some wetlands constitute “navigable 
waters,” while others do not); see also Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Are 
“Navigable Waters” Subject to Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et 
seq.), 160 A.L.R. FED. 585 (2000) (outlining the CWA disputes over “navigable waters” 
and itemizing which way courts have ruled on particular types of waters, from streams 
and marshes to ditches, drains, and groundwater).   
 195. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C § 903(a) (2012).   
 196. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 27.   
 197. See Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 
1995) (reasoning that because Congress did not provide a technical definition of 
“adjoining,” it must be read in its ordinary meaning).  The decision not to accord 
“adjoining” a technical meaning may have been a mistake, given the unusual definition 
of “navigable waters” discussed supra.  Supra note 194 and accompanying text.   
 198. Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138 (footnote omitted); see also New Orleans Depot Servs., 
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Program, 718 F.3d 384, 391–93 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (endorsing the Sidwell court’s approach and claiming that it better 
coincides with the plain language of the statute).  
 199. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
banc) (alleging that an expansive definition of “adjoining” was more congruous with 
congressional purpose), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).   
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eliminate these definitions as unusual or inappropriate, particularly 
given Congress’s goal of uniform coverage for harbor workers, whose 
work frequently takes them alternatively onto, next to, and near 
navigable waters, depending on their assigned tasks.200  Other circuits 
have simply noted the lack of precision in the statutory language and 
failed to address plain meaning entirely, preferring to follow 
Congress’s intent exclusively.201 
Interestingly, the Sidwell court refers readers to the 1993 edition of 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary for its narrow 
definition.202  However, a look at the 1981 edition of that dictionary, 
which expresses the meaning of “adjoining” as it was understood 
slightly before 1981—and less than a decade after the first set of 
LHWCA amendments passed—lends support for a different 
position.203  The 1981 edition defines “adjoining” as “touching or 
bounding at some point or on some line:  near in space 
islands . . . formed by owners living on the shores . . . .”204  While this 
definition could support the Sidwell court’s theory about the ordinary 
meaning of “adjoining,” the particular example cited in the 
dictionary suggests otherwise.  If islands off the coast can “adjoin” the 
shore, they must necessarily be near, neighboring, or in the vicinity of 
the shore, not touching or bounding the shore; otherwise, they would 
cease to be islands.205  Much as an island can adjoin the shore without 
touching it, the fact that harbor workers no longer consistently work 
on the water or on the immediately adjacent shore does not mean 
that their work no longer adjoins navigable waters.206 
                                                          
 200. Id. at 514–15 (holding that ousting these broader but perfectly plausible 
definitions of adjoining would result in unequal benefits to maritime employees and 
lead to disproportionate coverage of land activities).  
 201. See Nelson v. Am. Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 1998) (lamenting 
the statute’s imprecision); see also Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 
137, 140–41 (9th Cir. 1978) (referring to the Caputo discussion of congressional 
intent to determine how to interpret “adjoining”); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office 
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 634, 638 (3d Cir. 1976) (deploring the 
unsatisfactory draftsmanship of the 1972 amendments and comparing the 1972 
statutory language to the 1927 language to deduce congressional intent). 
 202. Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138.  
 203. See supra text accompanying note 95 (noting that the Sidwell court’s definition 
is by no means the only reasonable one).   
 204. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 27.   
 205. An island is defined as “a tract of land surrounded by water and smaller than 
a continent.”  Island, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/island?show=0&t=1402074017 (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).  
 206. Harbor workers’ tasks—especially repair and maintenance of shipping 
containers and longshoring equipment—now take place further inland than in prior 
decades as a result of containerization, but Congress recognized this as a reason to 
extend coverage.  S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10 (1972).   
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A number of concurring and dissenting judges in the New Orleans 
Depot Services en banc decision consequently took issue with the 
majority’s supposedly plain-meaning interpretation of the word, 
indicating that, even among people of a similarly high level of 
education, the “ordinary” meaning of “adjoining” is not so obvious.207  
While the majority claimed that the Sidwell approach “adheres more 
faithfully to the plain language of the statute,” quoting large blocks of 
text from the opinion, the concurring and dissenting opinions 
disagreed.208  For example, Judge Higginson noted in his concurring 
opinion that “Shakespeare spoke of the hills ‘adjoining’ Alexandria,” 
even though those hills were neither directly next to, nor “touching 
or abounding” the city in the way the judges used the term in the 
majority opinion.209  Coupled with the example in Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, “adjoining” carries a broader 
definition—at least in the context of geography—than the majority 
would like to assign it.  Judge Higginson also noted that 
[f]rom the standpoint of persons, industry, and legislators, 
unbroken contiguity to navigable water is impractical for reasons 
that our court identified in Winchester and that are even more 
pressing today:  land abutting water is finite and expensive, yet ship 
size and cargo capacity, total shipping volume, and loading and 
offloading equipment are ever-increasing. . . .  By contrast, this 
court in Winchester . . . pointed out that a strict abutment rule could 
exacerbate the very gangplank benefits coverage problem Congress 
sought to alleviate.210 
Parker proves a prime example of the constraints imposed by 
limited shoreside land availability and demonstrates the effect they 
have in tandem with an unnecessarily strict interpretation of 
“adjoining areas.”  Although expansion of Farrell Lines, Inc. 
                                                          
 207. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Higginson, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging that there is no certainty regarding the definition of 
“adjoining”); id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing that the majority’s 
definition of “adjoining” is too constraining and deepens the circuit split).  
 208. See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the court’s analysis in Sidwell); see also New 
Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 390–93 (discussing the merits of other circuits’ 
approaches, with an emphasis on the 4th Circuit).  But see id. at 399 (Higginson, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (exclaiming that even after examining the etymology of 
“adjoin” there is no certainty that it means contiguousness as opposed to adjacency); 
id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (advocating that the court follow the Winchester 
majority’s approach because it was consistent with the plain meaning of the text and 
the congressional purpose).   
 209. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 399 (Higginson, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (departing from the majority because the case should have been decided 
on the word “vessel,” thereby preventing any need for an examination of “adjoining”).   
 210. Id.  
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compelled it to relocate five miles inland, the Fourth Circuit refused 
to afford LHWCA coverage for the company’s employees whose work 
necessarily occurred farther from the marine terminal than before.211  
If such a strict interpretation were the only reasonable one, courts 
would naturally have to enforce it.  However, the dissent in New 
Orleans Depot Services asserted that the Winchester definition of 
“adjoining” fit both the plain meaning and the spirit of the law; 
furthermore, the dissenting judges believed that “the absence of any 
compelling evidence of Winchester’s dysfunction or [a] change in the 
maritime industry” precluded overruling the court’s long-standing 
and workable precedent.212 
Further clarifying the statute’s plain meaning, the legislative history 
effectively states that the bill “cover[s] injuries occurring in the 
contiguous dock area related to longshore and ship repair work.”213  
The Sidwell majority latched on to this statement as support for its 
definition of “adjoining.”214  However, the House Report, which 
shares identical language with much of the Senate Report, omits this 
statement.215  The majority disregarded this difference and interpreted 
the Senate Report’s statement as endorsing “contiguous” as the 
proper definition of “adjoining.”216  The Sidwell majority ignored the 
fact that a narrow interpretation of “contiguous” as “nearby” would 
still contradict other portions of the House and Senate Reports, 
which point to the need for a “uniform compensation system” for 
employees that would extend coverage to all of a qualifying 
employee’s activities.”217  Added to the fact that “contiguous,” like 
“adjoining,” can simply mean “nearby,” the propriety of the court’s 
definition is, at best, ambiguous and requires further examination 
than the plain meaning canon typically allows.218 
A plain meaning interpretation is tempting for its simplicity and 
clear line-drawing capabilities.  It would also rein in the over-
                                                          
 211. Parker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 75 F.3d 929, 931–33 
(4th Cir. 1996).  
 212. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 400–03 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (also 
criticizing Sidwell as an “outlier among [the] circuits” and observing the compelling 
need for “uniformity in maritime law”); see also Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 
632 F.2d 504, 514–15 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (carefully scrutinizing the dictionary 
definitions of “adjoining” and coming to the opposite conclusion as the majority in 
New Orleans Depot Services), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 213. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 2 (1972) (emphasis added).  
 214. Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 215. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 1–4 (1972) (omitting any mention of 
contiguity), with S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 2 (containing language about contiguity).   
 216. See Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138–39 (affirming a narrow definition of “adjoining”). 
 217. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11.  
 218. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 492 (defining “contiguous”). 
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expansive interpretations of the statute that the Fourth and recent 
Fifth Circuit decisions have aptly criticized.219  The plain meaning of 
“adjoining” is anything but clear, however, particularly when viewed 
exclusively through the lens of the plain meaning canon.220  To leave 
an injured employee’s livelihood to a court’s dictionary preferences 
would be arbitrary.  Furthermore, it would be antithetical to a 
“government of laws and not of men,” as panels of men (and women) 
throughout the country come to contradicting conclusions regarding 
an employee’s right to benefits.221  Thus, a plain meaning 
interpretation is—on its own—patently inappropriate here. 
2. Canon II:  The whole act rule 
Given the diversity of views on the plain meaning of “adjoining,” 
one must logically look beyond the plain meaning of the word to 
other contextual canons that could further enlighten the situation 
and guide judges in assigning benefits under the LHWCA.  With 
dueling narrow and broad interpretations in the case law and in the 
New Orleans Depot Services opinion, the question becomes just how far 
Congress intended to extend coverage, and a judge should naturally 
seek guidance from the rest of the Act, particularly the surrounding 
words.222  Unfortunately, however, the rest of § 903(a) only 
complicates matters for longshoremen.  As mentioned in Part II.A.1 
supra, the term “navigable waters” does not even refer to water under 
the new definition,223 and Parts II.A.3–5 infra demonstrate that the 
terms modifying navigable waters, particularly “including” and “other 
adjoining areas,” contribute scant help.224  Nothing in the definition 
                                                          
 219. See, e.g., New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Sidwell’s criticism 
of Sea-Land for its elimination of the situs requirement before electing a narrow 
scope of situs coverage).  
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200 (outlining the different 
definitions of “adjoining” used by courts).  
 221. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that this phrase originates from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
and quoting the text, which implies that only by separation of powers could the 
colonists create a “government of laws and not of men”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (asserting that this phrase will only retain its truth as 
long as the laws grant a remedy for the violation of every legal right).   
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200 (describing the numerous ways in 
which the circuit courts have defined “adjoin”); see also supra notes 207–09 and 
accompanying text (detailing the disputing definitions of “adjoin” among the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions in the New Orleans Depot Services opinion).  
 223. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 224. See infra Part II.A.3–5 (employing different canons of interpretation to 
highlight the various contradictory ways circuit courts have interpreted “including” 
and “other adjoining areas”).   
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section of the statute overtly applies to the situs question.225  However, 
looking more broadly at the statute, one can discern general 
guidance for interpreting the Act.  For example, Congress’s 
definition of “navigable waters” is expansive, not narrow, involving a 
long list of structures deemed “navigable waters.”226  Thus, even a 
textualist could review this document and detect a tendency toward 
broad coverage for injuries incurred in the course of longshoring work. 
An intentionalist would likely compare the 1972 statutory text to its 
predecessor, which omitted an extensive description of “navigable 
waters,” and conclude with even greater certainty that Congress 
intended to expand coverage with the 1972 amendments.227  In fact, 
most of the LHWCA situs cases discuss the history of the Act for just 
this reason,228 and Sea-Land specifically highlights the fact that 
Congress clearly hoped to expand coverage through the 1972 
amendments to workers who previously qualified only for state 
workers’ compensation.229  Rather than subject grievously injured 
workers and their families to the added burden of financial distress, 
Congress aimed to standardize, expand, and increase the quantity of 
federal coverage.230  The court in Sea-Land even compared its broad 
                                                          
 225. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2012).  The statute addresses the status 
requirement by defining the term “employee” but does identify the specific 
geographical location or situs boundary of the Act.  Id. §§ 902–903.  
 226. See id. § 903(a) (listing the structures deemed to be “navigable waters” 
under the statute). 
 227. See LHWCA of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927) 
(amended 1972) (defining “navigable waters” as “including any dry dock” without 
further elaboration); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 273–74 (elaborating on the 
whole act rule’s corollary—that Congress uses terms coherently across statutes—and 
pointing to Justice Scalia’s reference to other parts of the U.S. Code and ratified 
treaties in his interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012)).   
 228. See, e.g., Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 
459 U.S. 297, 299, 316-17 (1983) (comparing coverage before and after the 1972 
amendments to highlight Congressional expansion of “navigable waters” situs to 
include adjoining land areas); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 633–34 (3d Cir. 1976) (pointing to the “coverage” provision 
and “employer” definition in the 1972 amendments as manifestations of “an 
unmistakable congressional intention” to extend federal coverage inland). 
 229. Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at 633–34; see, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 
432 U.S. 249, 256–58, 263–65 (1977) (“The 1972 Amendments thus changed what 
had been essentially only a ‘situs’ . . . to one looking to both the ‘situs’ of the injury 
and the ‘status’ of the injured.”); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 
504, 508–10 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (contrasting the 1972 amendments’ “two-
prong test,” consisting of a broad-reaching situs and a status component and the 
1927 LHWCA statute that contained only a “water’s-edge situs test”), overruled in part 
by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 230. See S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 12–13 (1972) (concluding that the differing 
compensation received for the same type of injury depending upon where the injury 
occurred was an impetus for Congress to create a “uniform compensation system”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10 (1972) (“The Committee believes that the 
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interpretation with other maritime provisions in the United States 
Code—the Harter Act231 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act232—to 
ensure consistency across maritime statutory interpretations.233 
Despite the importance of the statute’s situs description in the 
1927 LHWCA, the amended Act downplays this requirement in favor 
of an increased focus on the status of the employee.234  While the 
LHWCA’s amended definition section does not explicitly address the 
location of injury, it makes a special effort to define “employee” as 
“any person engaged in maritime employment.”235  The only 
exceptions to this provision are eight subsequently enumerated 
categories of employment.236  This likewise demonstrates an interest in 
expansive coverage and a concern for the people involved in maritime 
employment more so than the technicalities of the situs requirement.237 
If courts take seriously their role of applying the will of the people 
as expressed by statute, they would favor a generous interpretation of 
the LHWCA because such an interpretation conforms to Congress’s 
intent to accord broad coverage and does not contradict the plain 
meaning of the statute.238  Limiting coverage could unnecessarily 
harm the very workers Congress was seeking to protect through the 
1972 amendments, based solely on judges’ preference for narrower 
statutory construction.  Further statutory analysis only reinforces the 
need for a broad interpretation of the LHWCA. 
                                                          
compensation . . . should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the 
injury occurred on land or over water.”).   
 231. Pub. L. No. 52-105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30702–
30703, 30705–30707 (2006)) (regulating the transportation of merchandise or 
property between U.S. and foreign ports).   
 232. Pub. L. No. 74-229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30701 
(2006)) (regulating the transportation of merchandise or property between U.S. 
and foreign ports).   
 233. Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at 639.   
 234. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (2012) (delineating the type of employees 
covered under the statute). 
 235. Id. (emphasis added). 
 236. Id. § 902(3)(A)–(H) (including a variety of exceptions, among them, 
employees in purely administrative tasks, employees in recreational or tourist-related 
endeavors, vendors, and temporary contractors). 
 237. Even before adopting the status requirement, courts hesitated to impose the 
technicalities of the statute where doing so seemed manifestly unfair.  Luckenbach 
S.S. Co. v. Norton, 106 F.2d 137, 138 (3d Cir. 1939) (refusing to follow the 
employee’s interpretation of a 1934 amendment to the LHWCA because it would 
give the statute a “narrowly technical and impractical construction”); see also Voris v. 
Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (concluding that the LHWCA applies even where the 
employee does not notify his employer in writing about an accident as long as the 
employer in fact had knowledge of the injury or the employee could not have given 
such notice under the circumstances).   
 238. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.  Congress created only eight 
exceptions to the group of employees covered by the amended Act, thus suggesting 
that the Act broadly applied to all other individuals.  Id.  
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3. Canon III:  Noscitur a sociis 
Because associated words in a statutory text modify and clarify each 
other, one should pay attention to the entire text of § 903(a), 
particularly the descriptive terms “including” and “other adjoining 
areas,” which receive consideration in Parts II.A.4–5 infra.239  
However, courts like the Fourth Circuit neglect the full range of 
analysis available under noscitur a sociis, applying only its narrower 
corollary, ejusdem generis, to the phrase “other adjoining areas” to 
determine that “other adjoining areas” must be structures or 
buildings like those explicitly enumerated in the statute.240  While the 
Fourth Circuit claimed that it would come to the same conclusion 
under noscitur a sociis,241 the Third Circuit explicitly rejected this 
approach just three years later in its Nelson opinion.242  It criticized 
Sidwell for looking only at the word “other,” rather than to the word 
“areas,” which denotes an open space, rather than a building or 
structure.243  Because this broader construction conformed with a 
dictionary definition and congressional intent, the Third Circuit 
dismissed the Sidwell approach, ruling instead that the claimant 
should have received coverage for the injuries that occurred when he 
slipped and fell from a bulldozer as he attempted to adjust a pipeline 
valve.244  However, most of the circuit courts went no further than this 
cursory analysis of “other adjoining areas,” despite the fact that a 
couple of other phrases in the LHWCA deserve consideration and 
potentially support a broader construction of the statute than New 
Orleans Depot Services adopted.245 
For example, the clause “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
section,”246 indicates a narrow set of circumstances under which no 
compensation should issue.  The word “except” modifies the text with 
an exception, providing a counterpoint that highlights the unclear 
                                                          
 239. See infra Parts II.A.4–5 (using the canons ejusdem generis and “presumption of 
nonexclusive ‘include’” to define “including” and “other adjoining areas”). 
 240. Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(arguing that even applying noscitur a sociis to the statute requires the interpreter to 
look to the other enumerated items in the list to determine which structures would 
satisfy the situs requirement of “other adjoining areas”).  This narrow application of 
noscitur a sociis exclusively to lists neglects the broad usefulness of the canon. 
 241. Id.; see infra Part II.A.4 (discussing how the canon of ejusdem generis can 
promote a narrower interpretation of the situs requirement).   
 242. Nelson v. Am. Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789, 797 (3rd Cir. 1998).   
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. at 792, 797–98.   
 245. See, e.g., id. at 797–98 (focusing on the definition of “other adjoining areas” to 
conclude that the employee should have received coverage under the Act); Sidwell, 
71 F.3d at 1136–39 (limiting the analysis to interpretation of “other adjoining areas” 
in determining whether the injured employee was covered under the LHWCA). 
 246. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012).  
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language in the rest of the statute.247  This implies that courts can 
take a more flexible approach to circumstances not excepted from 
coverage.  Those in favor of narrower interpretations might 
contradict this, rightly claiming that the injury must both fit into the 
definition of “navigable waters” and not fall into an exception to 
compensation.248  However, while the language regarding exceptions 
is rigid, the language defining “navigable waters” is not, suggesting 
different treatment of the two clauses.249  Because of this 
differentiating treatment, courts can justify more flexibility and 
interpret the “navigable waters” provision to aid disabled harbor 
workers while still strictly applying the exceptions provision. 
Additionally, maritime attorney F. Nash Bilisoly notes that the 
complete phrase “other adjoining area customarily used by an 
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a 
vessel” is particularly vague, which has caused courts to assign it 
several different meanings.250  The phrase “customarily used by an 
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a 
vessel”251 closes a series of multilayered modifiers.  In the LHWCA, 
the customary use phrase modifies “other adjoining areas,” which 
modifies the preceding list of terms, a list that describes examples of 
“navigable waters.”252  In fact, the Fourth Circuit, whose 
interpretation the New Orleans Depot Services court largely adopted, 
applies ejusdem generis to “other adjoining areas” without considering 
in detail the customary use clause, or “functional requirement,” 
attached to the situs component of the statute.253  However, it is in 
part from this clause that the Third and Ninth Circuits developed 
their theory that “[t]he line delimiting the outer reaches of the Act’s 
extended coverage is . . . functional and not spatial.”254  Such a 
                                                          
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (emphasizing the fluidity in the 
definition of “navigable waters”). 
 250. Bilisoly, supra note 11, at 518; see also LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).  Bilisoly 
has argued a number of LHWCA cases, including Sidwell.  See, e.g., Jonathan Corp. v. 
Brickhouse, 142 F.3d 217, 222–23 (4th Cir. 1998) (denying coverage for an employee 
who was injured at a steel fabrication plant because the plant’s raison d’être was not 
sufficiently connected to the nearby navigable waters); Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1141 
(holding that, under the court’s interpretation, the definition of “other adjoining 
area” did not extend to the site where the injury occurred).  
 251. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).   
 252. Id.  
 253. Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1139.  See generally LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (“an injury 
occurring upon . . . [an] other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in 
loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel”).   
 254. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 
629, 636, 638 (3d Cir. 1976) (indicating that a “nexus” to maritime activity is the only 
essential factor); see also Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140–41 
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presumption risks confusing the status and situs inquiries, but it also 
allows courts more flexibility to favor coverage for injured 
longshoremen and harbor workers in close cases.  While the Fifth 
Circuit now believes that the statute contains separate spatial and 
functional requirements within the situs requirement, the Ninth 
Circuit presumes that the functional requirement subsumes the 
spatial—that the spatial is just one element useful to analysis of the 
situs’s functional requirement.255 
Linguistically, the Fifth Circuit has the better argument on this 
point because the customary use clause appears to be an additional 
descriptor, not a replacement for the list of adjoining areas.256  
Otherwise, the list of “adjoining areas” would become mere 
surplusage.  However, the customary use clause may instead indicate 
that coverage under the Act’s situs requirement is partially functional 
and partially spatial, which would comport with use of the Herron 
multi-factor test for reasons different than those the court set out.257  
Reviewing accidents on a case-by-case basis, courts should find the 
situs requirement satisfied where there is a particularly compelling 
functional nexus, even where the geographical nexus is in doubt, and 
vice versa.  Under this theory, the customary use clause merely dilutes 
the “adjoining areas” factor with an additional element to consider 
(but not require), rather than adding another discrete requirement 
to coverage.  Thus, neither the broad nor the narrow statutory 
interpretations are completely correct.258  The Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning surpasses that of the more liberal readings from a textual 
standpoint, but the result of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning exceeds that 
of the Fifth Circuit and better favors compensation for injured workers. 
The Court’s analysis in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs v. Perini North River Associates259 also supports a broad 
                                                          
(9th Cir. 1978) (gleaning this concept of the “functional” from investigation into 
Congress’s intent).   
 255. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (claiming that the list of 
“other adjoining areas” dictates a spatial requirement, while the customary use clause 
mandates a functional requirement); Herron, 568 F.2d at 141 (delineating a 
multifactor test for determining employment’s “functional relationship” to situs).   
 256. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). 
 257. See Herron, 568 F.2d at 141 (creating a multifactor test which considers both 
the functionalsuch as the suitability of the site for maritime usesand the spatial 
relationshipsuch as looking at the “proximity of the site to the waterway”—to 
determine federal coverage under the Act).  
 258. Compare New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 389 (viewing the geographic and 
functional components as separate requirements, each of which must be proven to obtain 
coverage), with Herron, 568 F.2d at 140–41 (proposing a factors test, including the site’s 
proximity to the water and suitability for the maritime uses contemplated by the statute).   
 259. 459 U.S. 297 (1983).   
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interpretation of the statute.  The Perini court essentially argued that, 
“a plain reading of the Act reveals only that the 1972 amendments 
expanded coverage ashore and indicates nothing with respect to 
curtailment of coverage.”260  At most, Congress expected that the situs 
inquiry could become overbroad, and it corrected for this by 
including a status inquiry, which requires an employee to qualify as 
such under the definition section of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).261  This 
suggests that any “curtailment” of benefits would be vested not in the 
situs requirement but in the status requirement, further supporting a 
liberal—but not unfaithful—interpretation of the situs language that 
better indemnifies accident victims.262  While some injured workers 
unfortunately will not satisfy the status requirement, this is part of the 
statutory framework.263  However, it is unreasonable to limit benefits 
based exclusively on two circuits’ preferred readings of the situs 
requirement, especially given the weight of the evidence in favor of 
affording liberal benefits to longshoremen, harbor workers, and, by 
extension, to their dependent family members.264  Such limitations 
merely create uneven benefits regimes based on where a person’s 
injury occurs, rather than providing uniform coverage across the 
United States for all those whom Congress intended to cover.265 
4. Canon IV:  Ejusdem generis 
Despite the many reasons to favor an expansive interpretation of 
the situs requirement, an application of ejusdem generis—the inference 
that “other” unenumerated items following a list must share 
characteristics with the items specifically mentioned in the list—may 
                                                          
 260. Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 67 (summarizing the Perini Court’s 
conclusion); see Perini, 459 U.S. at 315–19 (concluding that Congress did not intend 
the status requirement to limit coverage for those who would previously have 
received coverage under the Act after an injury actually occurring on the water).   
 261. See, e.g., Perini, 459 U.S. at 317–18 (noting that the status requirement reined 
in the scope of the 1972 amendments by defining the employees covered); Ne. 
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264 (1977) (concluding that the 
expansion of the geographical scope of the Act’s coverage under the 1972 
amendments made it necessary for Congress to add the status requirement to 
“describe affirmatively the . . . workers Congress desired to compensate”).  
 262. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264 (arguing that Congress’s inclusion of the status 
requirement under the 1972 amendments was implemented to curtail the 
broadened scope of the situs test); Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 67.   
 263. See S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (1972) (“The Committee does not intend to 
cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a 
vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such 
activity.”); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 11 (1972) (explaining that an employee responsible 
for picking up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not receive coverage).  
 264. See, Perini, 459 U.S. at 317–18; Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264.  
 265. See S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11.  Both reports 
indicate that Congress was concerned with creating “a uniform compensation system.”   
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be the one canon discussed here whose application could potentially 
promote a narrower interpretation of the situs requirement.  
Unsurprisingly, the Fourth Circuit flags this canon in its Sidwell 
analysis, noting that the phrase “other adjoining areas” following 
Congress’s list of qualifying locations invokes ejusdem generis and 
potentially provides interpretive insight into the statute.266 
Citing Sidwell, the Fifth Circuit applied this canon to conclude that 
an “other adjoining area” as to which coverage extends must be 
like a “pier,” “wharf,” “dry dock,” “terminal,” “building way,” or 
“marine railway.”  Each of these enumerated “areas” is a discrete 
structure or facility, the very raison d’[ê]tre of which is its use in 
connection with navigable waters.  Therefore, in order for an area 
to constitute an “other area” under the statute, it must be a discrete 
shoreside structure or facility.267 
However, the dissent notes that such a construction would harm 
maritime employees because it would provide employers an easy 
opportunity to evade LWHCA coverage by purchasing property near 
the shore with a small strip of land separating it from the water’s 
edge.268  Such a construction by itself should therefore not hold up to 
scrutiny, given the presumption against ineffectiveness, when another 
legitimate interpretation exists.269  When added to concerns over 
availability and cost of seaside property, such an interpretation, 
though reasonable, raises significant practical concerns.270  For 
example, it could unintentionally constrict LHWCA coverage when 
otherwise qualifying maritime employment necessarily takes place a 
little farther from shore than a strict statutory construction will allow.  
Furthermore, such an outcome seems to conflict with Congress’s 
intent for broad coverage, as manifested in both the language of the 
Act and in its legislative history, and would unduly harm injured 
longshoremen and harbor workers.271 
                                                          
 266. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012); Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 
71 F.3d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes 154–59 for 
a description of ejusdem generis.   
 267. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
718 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1139).   
 268. Id. at 402 (Stewart, J., dissenting).   
 269. See supra Part I.C.2.f. (articulating the presumption against ineffectiveness, 
which favors interpretations that promote rather than hinder the statute’s purpose).   
 270. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 399 (Higginson, J., concurring). 
 271. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2 (comparing the 1972 statutory text to its predecessor 
to conclude that Congress intended for the coverage under the 1972 amendments to 
be broad); see also infra Part II.A.5 (applying the canon “presumption of nonexclusive 
‘include’” to argue that use of the word “including” supports the position that 
Congress intended for the statute to be applied broadly).   
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5. Canon V:  “Presumption of Nonexclusive ‘Include’”272 
In contrast to the potentially narrower coverage workers would 
receive under ejusdem generis, the use of the word “including” militates 
in support of expansive coverage for maritime workers.  In the 
statutory text, a list of areas that qualify as “navigable waters” follows 
the word “including.”273  Because the word “including” generally 
precedes an illustrative example, not an exclusive list,274 the listed 
items are likely not the only landward objects that constitute 
“navigable waters” under Congress’s new definition.  Although other 
circuits have not intentionally or regularly applied this canon, the 
Third Circuit, at least, construed the statute’s list of enumerated areas 
to be non-exclusive, especially in light of Congress’s desire to 
broaden coverage for injured workers.275 
However, the overlapping application of this canon with ejusdem 
generis creates confusion because “including” theoretically expands 
the possible types of “navigable waters” landward, while “other 
adjoining area[s]” limits its overexpansion.  Because the two canons 
counteract each other, the scope of “navigable waters” is both 
indefinite and ambiguous.  The Fourth Circuit argues under ejusdem 
generis that because all the listed items are “discrete structure[s] or 
facilit[ies], the very raison d’[ê]tre of which is its use in connection 
with navigable waters,” all other qualifying situses must share that 
quality.276  However, under the presumption of the non-exclusive 
“include,” this logic is akin to saying that a grocery list that includes 
human food and drink, for example, chicken, vegetables, and tea, 
must exclude items like toilet paper, Swiffer wipes, and cat food.  In 
other words, the two canons propose contradicting levels of 
specificity and offer little guidance to resolve the conflict.  
Consequently, circuit courts have elected which canons to apply—
apparently based on nothing more than their own preferences—
rather than trying to reconcile the two.277  Perhaps because of this 
                                                          
 272. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 132.  
 273. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012) (citing certain areas that qualify as 
“navigable waters” among which are piers, wharves, and dry docks).   
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63 (describing the applicable canon, 
which argues that the verb “include” suggests examples and not an exhaustive list).   
 275. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 
629, 638 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Bos., Inc., 539 
F.2d 264, 272 (1st Cir. 1976) (explaining—without naming any particular canon—
that the court did not believe Congress intended to restrict “adjoining” solely to the 
areas associated with the vessel).   
 276. Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1995).   
 277. See, e.g., New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (favorably citing and 
adopting Sidwell’s use of ejusdem generis); Nelson v. Am. Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789, 
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conflict, judges have preferred to turn directly to Congress’s intent 
and the presumption against ineffectiveness, both of which illuminate 
an overall desire for expansive coverage that would alleviate the 
physical and financial hardship that disabled maritime workers and their 
families suffer under a narrow interpretation of the situs requirement.278 
6. Canon VI:  Presumption against ineffectiveness 
As noted in Part II.A.4, strictly applying ejusdem generis to the 
LHWCA would render the statute ineffective if a clever employer 
ensured that a strip of someone else’s land lay between his property 
and the shore.279  For example, a situation could occur where one 
small property (say fifty yards from the shore) intervened between 
the shoreline and the site of a maritime employer (whose property 
was one hundred yards from shore).  Under the Fifth Circuit 
interpretation, injuries to maritime workers that occurred on this 
employer’s property would not be covered.280  Yet a large maritime 
employer with a property extending five hundred yards from shore 
could send his employee to a back warehouse four hundred yards 
from shore, and that employee could receive compensation under 
the LHWCA.281  This potential circumvention of the statute further 
justifies application of the canon presuming that “including” is a non-
exclusive term, because that canon permits a broader interpretation 
than ejusdem generis and thus would more likely give effect to the 
statute.282  In fact, the overwhelming weight of LHWCA situs case law 
implicitly follows the presumption against ineffectiveness, discussing 
at length Congress’s intent in enacting the 1972 amendments before 
choosing interpretations based on what will best give effect to that 
intent.283  Although this choice sometimes occurs at the expense of 
                                                          
797 (3rd Cir. 1998) (applying noscitur a sociis, but not ejusdem generis, to reject a 
narrow construction of the statute); Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1139 (neglecting to apply the 
canon that presumes the non-exclusive use of include and noting that under both 
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, “adjoining” would take a narrow definition); Sea-
Land, 540 F.2d at 638 (assuming that the list of adjoining areas is not exhaustive).   
 278. See infra Parts II.A.2–3 (applying the canons of interpretation to explain 
Congress’s intention for a broad construction of the statute).  
 279. Supra text accompanying notes 268–70.   
 280. See New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 392 (quoting Sidwell 71 F.3d at 1139) 
(defining “other area” under the statute as “a discrete shoreside structure or facility”). 
 281. See id. at 402 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (extrapolating from the dissent’s 
concerns that an overly literal interpretation would allow employers to “circumvent 
LHWCA coverage”).   
 282. See supra Part II.A.3–5 (discussing the conflicting interpretations between 
nocitur a sosciis, ejusdem generis, and the presumption of the non-exclusive include).  
 283. See, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268–71, 273 
(1977) (probing the legislative history for evidence of Congress’s intent and applying 
their discoveries to favor broad coverage in the case at hand); Brady-Hamilton 
Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (choosing its multi-factor 
DAVIES.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2014  12:40 PM 
1944 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1901 
traditional textual statutory interpretation, it certainly corresponds 
with the concept of preventing ineffectiveness and fulfills the Act’s 
goal of providing injury compensation coverage for harbor workers.284 
To ensure the statute’s effectiveness, courts that do not assume the 
non-exclusivity of the word “include” could alternatively apply a 
liberal construction of ejusdem generis that deemed find “other 
adjoining areas” to be areas near the shore used for loading and 
unloading shipping cargo (or for other maritime employment 
purposes).  While the term “other adjoining areas” should add 
something to the statute, if doing so would contradict other 
principles of interpretation and Congress’s intent for broad 
application, it would be safer to assume that this is simply a situation 
where the messiness of lawmaking and the need for compromise 
cause duplications in the statute and result in provisions that 
undermine each other.285  In such a case, the presumption against 
ineffectiveness supports the idea that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ 
use of ejusdem generis unfairly restricts benefits where every other 
canon thus far would cover a worker’s broad but otherwise 
reasonable claim.286  The presumption against ineffectiveness attacks 
the propriety of such a narrow interpretation, rejecting it as 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent, and instead favors coverage for 
disabled maritime employees. 
7. Canon VII:  Absurdity doctrine 
Given that Congress’s very purpose in passing this Act was to 
prevent workers from walking in and, more importantly, out of 
coverage, it would be unreasonable to think that the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the LHWCA is correct; such an interpretation 
merely perpetuates the problem that Congress hoped to cure.287  The 
New Orleans Depot Services decision may even cross the line into 
absurdity, although a textualist would likely take issue with such a 
                                                          
situs test to prevent deserving maritime workers from falling too easily outside of 
coverage); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Bos., Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 273–77 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441 (1972)) (setting forth three principle messages from 
the House Report and rejecting a narrow interpretation of the Act).   
 284. See, e.g., Herron, 568 F.2d at 141 (eschewing any discussion of statutory 
construction but choosing a workable situs test that would effectuate Congress’s goals).   
 285. ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 271–72 (highlighting the disconnect between 
the presumptions that interpretive theories develop about lawmaking and the 
reality of the process).  
 286. See generally New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 384; Sidwell v. Express 
Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 287. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273–74 (reasoning that Congress’s 1972 amendments to 
the LHWCA aimed to provide full federal coverage for those “amphibious” workers who 
had previously only been able to receive federal benefits for part of their employment).   
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statement.288  Critics of Church of the Holy Trinity and similar absurdity-
doctrine cases alternatively claim either that the Court ignored most 
of the legislative deliberations, which showed that Congress was trying 
to prevent the very things that the Act appeared to prevent, or that 
any attempt to avoid enforcing the law is undemocratic and a 
dereliction of judicial duty.289 
The first of these arguments does not apply here, given textual 
evidence of Congress’s intent.290  Furthermore, both the House and 
the Senate Reports on the LHWCA amendments use largely the same 
language, write at length about the “purpose and background” of the 
amendments, and make clear statements about intent.291  Nothing 
here implies that a liberal interpretation somehow ignores Congress’s 
intent.  Congress was unquestionably addressing the coverage 
problems that a strict situs requirement caused for maritime 
employees and demonstrated its intent to broaden the definition, 
which courts can see from the additions to the definition of 
“navigable waters.”292  To ignore legislative intent at least as a 
component in interpreting the statute would be to put blinders on 
and discard all context, when the very purpose of the law was to 
address specific coverage problems in the pre-1972 legislation.293  In a 
sense, not looking to intent would be undemocratic and a dereliction 
of judicial duty because it would ignore the will of the people as 
expressed by a democratically-elected Congress.  Ignoring intent and 
selecting a narrow interpretation would effectively render the statute 
useless in its application and “not within the statute, because not 
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”294  Thus, 
                                                          
 288. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 237–38 (noting textualists’ concern 
that recourse to the spirit of the law may invite abuse and judicial lawmaking).  
 289. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 223 (arguing that Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), provoked a new generation of textualists 
whose goal of interpretation was to discern the text’s plain meaning instead of 
referring to legislative history).   
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 185–88. 
 291. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (1972) 
(stating “The intent of the Committee is . . . The Committee does not intend . . . 
[T]he Committee has no intention of . . .”). 
 292. Compare LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012) (expanding “navigable waters” to 
include a list of many more shoreside structures than the 1927 statute had 
permitted), with LHWCA of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 
(1927) (1927 enactment of the statute) (referring only to “navigable waters of the 
United States (including any dry dock)” without further elaboration).   
 293. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 1639, 1639 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)–(H)). 
 294. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.  In other words, a narrow definition 
of “adjoining” would “reenact the hard lines that caused longshoremen to move 
continually in and out of coverage [and] frustrate . . . congressional objectives . . . .”  
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judges of an intentionalist bent might apply the absurd results canon 
to achieve a result that follows the spirit of the law.  While textualists 
likely would not apply the absurd results canon here, many of the 
common canons discussed above could allow them to ascertain 
Congress’s intent through the text and apply a more liberal 
interpretation of the statute than that of the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits.295  Thus, application of the absurd results canon, which 
sometimes seems an extreme measure, is merely possible, not 
necessary, to achieving expanded coverage for the workers Congress 
has tried time and again to protect.296 
8. Canon VIII:  Remedial statutes 
Given Congress’s many efforts to compensate injured 
longshoremen and harbor workers,297 it seems that the LHWCA was 
always, in essence, remedial.  Initially, it remedied the lack of 
coverage caused by Jensen and the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
state and federal attempts at statutory compensation.298  Despite the 
early challenges in erecting a statutory framework for 
compensation,299 the courts began recommending a liberal 
construction of the statute to “avoid[] harsh and incongruous 
results,” a goal reflecting its remedial nature.300  Because the LHWCA 
of 1927 tried to enhance previously nonexistent benefits and cure the 
Jensen misstep, it corresponds well with Shapiro’s observations about 
application of the remedial statutes canon.301  The 1972 amendments 
further support this view of the LHWCA because the changes 
amended coverage problems in the earlier legislation, thereby 
                                                          
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 514–15 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
banc), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s 
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).   
 295. See generally New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013); Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 
F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995); supra Parts II.A.2–3, 5. 
 296. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (detailing Congress’s earlier 
attempts to provide coverage for longshoremen and harbor workers).   
 297. Id.  
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 16–19 (describing the effect of the 
Jensen decision).   
 299. See supra text accompanying note 16 (listing the failed attempts to cover 
maritime workers under state and federal workers’ compensation plans, which 
prompted passage of the LHWCA). 
 300. Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333–34 (1953); Balt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. 
Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930).  
 301. See SHAPIRO, supra note 181, at 938 (postulating that the canon most often 
applies to laws correcting a prior legislative or judicial error and to laws enhancing 
benefits awards).   
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extending benefits to more people.302  In fact, the Supreme Court 
specifically refers to the LHWCA as “remedial legislation” in Caputo, 
which the Court decided shortly after the 1972 amendments 
passed.303  Even among the circuit courts, there is unanimous 
agreement about the Act’s remedial nature.304  Although the 1984 
amendments narrowed coverage based on status, this move supports 
the idea that Congress had a specific set of people in mind when it 
passed the 1972 legislation; it wanted to compensate those workers 
who sustained disabling or lethal injuries as a result of their work in 
traditional longshoring operations, not those who happened to be 
shoreside employees in another industry.305 
In addition to inquiry about the objective function of Congress’s 
legislation, a foray into the controversial territory of legislative intent 
demonstrates that Congress’s goals in enacting the LHWCA were 
“remedial.”  The House and Senate Reports both use language 
explicitly informing readers of its intent and purposes in enacting the 
statute, alleviating some questions over the courts’ ability to discern 
intent.306  The reports’ language also speaks to the inadequacy of state 
workers’ compensation programs, changes in longshoring operations, 
and the problem of shifting coverage, indicating that Congress’s 
concern was more for the particular type of workers involved and only 
                                                          
 302. Id.; see also Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 1251, 1251 (1972) 
(expanding coverage to workers who were injured on certain “adjoining area[s]” as 
opposed to the pre-1972 situation, where only workers injured on “navigable 
waters” were compensated). 
 303. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268, 279 (1977).  
 304. See, e.g., Nelson v. Am. Dredging Co., 143 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(finding the Sidwell interpretation inconsistent with the LHWCA’s remedial goals); 
Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(claiming that its narrow interpretation still achieves the Act’s remedial goals without 
“extending coverage to all those who breathe salt air” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 519 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en banc) (noting the Act’s “humanitarian purposes”), overruled in part by New 
Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 
(5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 
140 (9th Cir. 1978) (commenting on the Act’s remedial purpose in discussion of 
the status requirement).   
 305. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 1639, 1639 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)–(H)) (narrowing the range of qualifying employment to exclude 
those involved in shore side entertainment and service industries, as well as other 
employees not engaged in longshoring operations).  If the worker’s injuries prove 
fatal, the LHWCA provides a “death benefit” to surviving family members. LHWCA, 
33 U.S.C. § 909 (2012).  
 306. See supra text accompanying note 291 (explaining both Committees’ intent to 
prohibit coverage under the Act for individuals not working for an employer engaged 
in some form of maritime employment).   
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secondarily for the actual location of their accident.307  In other words, 
Congress worried about the fairness of arbitrarily disparate and 
inadequate benefits because the coincidence of where one is injured 
hardly seems an appropriate means to determine benefits.308 
Detractors’ most legitimate argument against application of this 
canon attacks the canon itself, not its application, because if any 
statute qualifies as “remedial,” this one does.309  Although the idea 
that every law is “remedial” has some merit,310 it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the canon is reactionary:  it applies only in reference to 
a specific and faulty past statutory enactment or judicial decision, not 
to laws that merely fill in an omission in the general legal 
landscape.311  In other words, remedial statutes cure “a judicial 
misstep or an earlier legislative error” or increase certain people’s 
ability to receive benefits without significantly altering the existing 
benefits regime.312  Under these terms, the canon appears far more 
workable, not to mention highly applicable to the LHWCA’s 
indemnity scheme for disabled harbor workers. 
B. Recommendations 
Given the overwhelming evidence in favor of a broad 
interpretation of the LHWCA, both Congress and the courts have 
sufficient guidance to resolve the current circuit split via legislative or 
judicial action respectively.313  While congressional action could 
definitively end the circuit split, longshoremen and harbor workers 
likely do not top Congress’s list of pressing issues.314  Courts, however, 
will likely contemplate LHWCA cases from time to time and should 
aim for uniformity of approach and broad statutory construction that 
                                                          
 307. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 12–13 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10–11 (1972) 
(noting that compensation should not depend on whether the injury happened on 
land or on water); see also Caputo, 432 U.S. at 257 (emphasizing longshoremen’s need 
for uniformity under “one law to cover their whole employment”).   
 308. Even the legislative history preceding the 1927 version of the law noted the 
issue of shifting coverage.  H.R. REP. NO. 67-639, at 1–2 (1922) (remarking on the 
shift from state coverage to no coverage depending on the location of the injury).   
 309. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 364–65 (identifying problems with this 
canon and viewing it as resistance against the widespread belief that statutes 
contradicting the common law must be strictly construed). 
 310. Id. (arguing that all laws cure one issue or another, thus making all laws remedial).  
 311. SHAPIRO, supra note 181, at 938.   
 312. Id.   
 313. See generally Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).  See also 
Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 314. See Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 88, 102 (“Congress, with a sharp 
pencil in hand, has the power to draft legislation amending the Act to reflect its 
original intent.”).   
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favors coverage when doing so.315  Thus, this Comment proceeds to 
offer both statutory and judicial remedies in the hope of settling the 
present circuit split. 
1. Congressional remedy 
Congress’s elaboration on the situs requirement has resulted in an 
unwieldy law with unclear limitations.  Congress should therefore 
revisit the statute and eliminate the situs requirement in favor of a 
status-only inquiry.  The statute’s descriptive (but unclear) language, 
remedial purpose, and the addition of a status requirement—
mandating that claimants also qualify as an “employee” under the 
definition section of the statute—indicate that Congress felt 
uncomfortable drawing bright lines around the qualifying place of 
injury.316  However, the complete lack of clarity on where to draw the 
line for a qualifying situs leads to questions about the usefulness of 
the requirement.  For example, why not eliminate the situs 
requirement completely, as the Third Circuit did until the Caputo 
decision,317 and focus instead on the type of person Congress wanted 
to afford coverage—longshoremen, harbor workers, and other types 
of maritime employees?  Alternatively, why not make the situs one 
component in determining status as a qualifying maritime employee?  
Instead, the separation of the LHWCA’s situs and status requirements 
has led to incongruous results.318  Of course, one could argue that the 
status and situs requirements complement each other and provide 
checks on each other:  “Each test acts as a control upon the other so 
as to diminish the potential for undue expansion of coverage.”319  
However, this works only insofar as a given circuit does not over- or 
under-interpret the reach of the requirements; a given circuit could 
broadly interpret both or narrowly interpret both so that standards 
vary enormously from circuit to circuit.  This anomaly, though 
seemingly minor in theory, has devastating results when viewed from 
                                                          
 315. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating which circuits frequently 
addressed maritime cases). 
 316. See LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a) (2012); see also supra Parts II.A.1, 8 
(discussing remedial statutes and the issues with plain meaning interpretation of 
the LHWCA). 
 317. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 
629, 638–39 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 318. See, e.g., Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1141 (4th Cir. 
1995) (ruling against the claimant under a strict interpretation of the statute); Sea-
Land, 540 F.2d at 638-39 (construing the statute liberally to find in favor of the 
claimant); see also CLARK, supra note 11, at 857–58 (contemplating the benefits of the 
Winchester decision’s expansive statutory interpretation and the potential 
consequences of the alternatives). 
 319. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1978).   
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the perspective of a worker—and his family—who does not receive 
coverage under a narrow interpretation of the Act. 
Congress should therefore abandon the situs requirement, which is 
so nebulous that the only information to glean from it is that courts 
should be generous in their statutory interpretation.  As things stand 
currently, the situs and status requirements interfere with each other 
and preclude the courts from achieving Congress’s goals.320  They 
create two contradictory tests, and the contradiction most often stems 
from the situs requirement.321  In fact, in their analysis of the situs 
requirement, courts rarely manage to avoid using language related to 
status, because the only reason a person typically visits a site is due to 
his status as a maritime employee.322 
Thus, Congress should adopt the status requirement as the 
exclusive test for coverage.  Although the New Orleans Depot Services 
court noted that it had no cause to review the ALJ’s assessment that 
the plaintiff met the Act’s status requirement, the status requirement, 
if properly applied, may actually have been a better check on 
coverage than the situs requirement in this case.323  Furthermore, 
Congress’s biggest concern was not over-extension of coverage; it was 
the Act’s failure to cover workers all of the time instead of part of the 
time.324  It seems logical then that if a worker’s job qualifies part of 
the time, it should qualify all of the time, regardless of where the 
individual’s duties take place.325  Perhaps the best test would be 
whether workers could potentially be required to participate in 
                                                          
 320. Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at 638.  Rather than proceeding to wrestle with these 
contradictions, however, the Third Circuit simply threw out the situs requirement in 
certain situations, incurring harsh and largely legitimate criticism from other circuits.  
See, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 277 n.40 (1977) (frowning 
upon the Third Circuit dismissal of the situs test); New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. 
Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (upholding Sidwell’s interpretation); Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1139–40.   
 321. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (1927 enactment of the statute) 
(explaining that the courts’ broad interpretations of the situs requirement resulted 
in ambiguous laws with unclear limitations as precedent). 
 322. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (2012) (emphasizing the importance of the 
status of the employee by making a special effort to broadly define an employee as 
“any person engaged in maritime employment”).   
 323. New Orleans Depot Servs., 718 F.3d at 387.  In New Orleans Depot Services, for 
example, the company worked on repair and maintenance of shipping containers 
and chassis, some of which transported ocean cargo.  Id. at 386–87.  Although in this 
case the lower court determined that the company was a maritime employer, perhaps 
another court would find otherwise if, for example, ocean cargo containers 
constituted only 5% of a company’s work, and workers never had cause to go near 
the ships or the shoreline.  Id. at 387.  
 324. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 272, 276; Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Bos., 
Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 275 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The evil of the old Act was that it bifurcated 
coverage for essentially the same employment.”).   
 325. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273–74. 
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longshoring operations, including transportation of cargo from a 
ship, during their workday—a status test based on type of 
employment.  If so, they would be eligible for LHWCA benefits, even 
if some of the cargo were being transported far inland.  Then 
Congress and the courts could discard the situs requirement 
outright.326  Those who do not approach the shoreline at any point 
for longshoring operations likely have no need for the Act, because 
they do not encounter the same dangers or general working 
conditions that longshoremen and harbor workers do, and they 
would likely receive coverage under state compensation schemes.327  
However, the nature of their jobs (and thus their employee status) 
would reflect that. 
Much of the problem with the Act derives from Congress’s 
approach to the LHWCA amendments.  As the Senate Report makes 
clear, the purpose of the act was to “extend coverage to protect 
additional workers.”328  However, the statute formerly applied a strict 
situs approach, so Congress aimed to achieve its goal by addressing 
what seemed to be the problem:  the overly-restrictive situs 
requirement.  It relaxed and expanded the situs requirement to cover 
the workers it had in mind.  In doing so, it recognized the necessity of 
“describ[ing] affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to 
compensate.”329  In other words, Congress complicated matters for 
itself by broadening an otherwise clear statue.330  By expanding 
coverage shoreside across the Jensen line, Congress destroyed the 
                                                          
 326. Even with the help of canons of construction, the situs requirement makes 
little sense in plain English.  For example, it is quite a stretch of the English language 
to call piers, docks, and the like “navigable waters.” 
 327. See, e.g., Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1135 (4th Cir. 
1995) (indicating that the plaintiff had already received compensation under the 
state workers’ compensation scheme that covered workers injured on adjoining 
lands, piers, or wharves as opposed to those workers injured on navigable waters who 
were covered exclusively under LHWCA). 
 328. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 1 (1972).  The House Report likewise states a desire 
“to provide adequate income replacement for disabled workers . . . .”  H.R. REP. NO. 
92-1441, at 1 (1972).   
 329. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 
297, 317–18 (1983); Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264.  
 330. See Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1138–39 (ruling mere proximity insufficient and 
announcing that the situs requirement must be literally read to adjoin navigable 
waters); Textports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 513–15 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en banc) (enforcing a totality of the circumstances test to determine coverage), 
overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. 
Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (elaborating the Ninth Circuit’s liberal 
approach to compensation coverage but refusing to throw away the situs requirement).  
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statute’s previously clear jurisdictional coverage.331  It therefore added 
the status inquiry as a check on overbroad extension of the Act.332 
As part of a status-only test, Congress could incorporate situs as a 
factor by granting benefits to injured “employees who would otherwise 
be covered by this Act for [the seaward] part of their activity.”333  This 
would comport with the idea that Congress wanted to cover those 
who encountered maritime dangers, rather than regular dangers, 
because someone employed in a maritime job would certainly 
encounter those dangers on a regular, though perhaps not constant, 
basis.334  An employee should be able to satisfy the new situs “factor” 
when a part of his work—no matter how insignificant—takes place on 
land that is literally next to the ocean; work far from the shoreside 
might require more evidence to satisfy the new “situs factor” of a revised 
status test.  This could then serve as a more effective check on status. 
The New Orleans Depot Services court cited Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. 
Gray,335 arguing that “there will always be a boundary to coverage, and 
there will always be people who cross it during their employment.  If 
that phenomenon was enough to require coverage, the Act would 
have to reach much further than anyone argues that it does or 
should.”336  This is true, as long as there is a situs requirement.  
However, if the courts were to redefine coverage by employment 
status, they would avoid such a problem.  Furthermore, Congress’s 
concern was not “walking in and out of coverage” in the sense of 
coming to work in the morning or leaving at night.  Such an 
interpretation would be utterly absurd, as every employed person 
does this on a daily basis.  Its concern was tied to the actual 
employment type and the differing coverage that a person might 
receive during the course of the same employment.337 
                                                          
 331. Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 53–54.  
 332. Id. at 54. 
 333. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13; H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, at 10–11.  A similar 
possibility would be for Congress to leave the Act intact, insofar as it pertains to those 
actually on navigable waters, and add a distinct, exclusively status-based test for those 
injured on land.  Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 89 (recommending a 
“bipartite eligibility scheme” that would maintain the situs requirement for seaward 
injuries and replace it with a status requirement for landward injuries).   
 334. See Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 11, at 84 (arguing that for employees 
engaged in offshore oilfield work, eligibility under the LHWCA, which seeks to 
remedy maritime perils, should depend upon whether an employer ordered an 
employee onto navigable waters).  
 335. 470 U.S. 414, 426–27 (1985) (5–4 decision).  
 336. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 384, 393 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 426–27).  
 337. See Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 273–74 (1977) 
(explaining that Congress intended to cover workers who engaged, at least partially, 
in traditional longshoring activities and reiterating that it intended to eliminate the 
pre-1972 phenomenon of shifting coverage).   
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If instead, Congress really wanted to focus on geography and 
extend a “hard line,” it should clarify where that line is and 
acknowledge that some workers will inevitably pass in and out of 
coverage.338  This might mean developing an exclusive list of 
“adjoining areas” and eliminating the word “including” from the 
statute to avoid application of the canon presuming the non-
exclusiveness of “include.”339  It should indicate that situs is the 
primary focus of the test to avoid any potential contradictions with a 
status requirement. 
2. Judicial remedy 
In lieu of a congressional remedy, courts should not defer to the 
Fifth Circuit’s “plain meaning” approach, if only because the statute’s 
“plain meaning” is ambiguous, while Congress’s purpose in passing 
the Act is not.340  Application of the Ninth Circuit’s Herron factors 
offers the most moderate judicial path.341  This approach recognizes 
that the purpose of the extension was to grant continuous coverage 
to “amphibious workers” and that the employee’s particular activity at 
the time of injury does not matter.342  Just as the employee’s 
particular activity does not matter, his specific location should not be 
dispositive:  “the phrase ‘adjoining area’ should be read to describe a 
functional relationship that does not in all cases depend upon 
physical contiguity.”343  However, this is arguably the least clear 
approach because it requires judges to rule on a case-by-case basis, 
and workers’ circumstances will differ in varying degrees.  
Furthermore, since the 1917 Jensen opinion, Congress has been 
aiming for uniformity of coverage.344  Weaknesses aside, Fitzhugh 
notes that the Benefits Review Board typically relies on Herron factors 
where the circuit courts do not have established criteria for 
                                                          
 338. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 514–15 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en banc), overruled in part by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of 
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 339. See supra Part I.C.2.e (non-exclusive use of “include”).  
 340. See supra Part II.A.1 (demonstrating the lack of clarity in a plain meaning review 
of the LHWCA); supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (indicating Congress’s intent).   
 341. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(establishing a test that considers the site’s suitability for maritime uses, whether 
maritime commerce constitutes the surrounding properties’ principal occupation, 
the distance between the site and the waterway, and whether the site is as near as 
possible to the shore).  
 342. Id. at 140. 
 343. Id. at 141. 
 344. H.R. REP. NO. 67-639, at 1–2 (1922).  
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determining situs.345  This implies that the Benefits Review Board 
finds the test to be both workable and reasonable. 
The best approach, then, would be for courts to look first to status 
as the primary element of a benefits claim and second to situs using 
the Herron factors.  Given clear congressional intent to expand 
LHWCA coverage for injured maritime workers, any case involving 
interpretation of the situs requirement should broadly construe the 
law, providing coverage where not unreasonable.346  Thus, courts 
should view someone employed in a job that requires him to work 
seaward of the Jensen line as working on a qualifying situs by nature of 
his job.347  An examination of the Ninth Circuit factors would 
complement analysis of an unclear situs and ensure that the results of 
the case are not incongruous.348  Because this approach leads towards 
a conflation of situs and status, it might prompt the Supreme Court to 
take up the issue, which it has refused to do on a number of occasions.349 
While Sea-Land’s earlier dismissal of situs is more appealing for its 
clarity, asking other courts to discard a statutory provision that is 
clearly present would be akin to asking them not to uphold the law as 
                                                          
 345. Fitzhugh, supra note 3, at 307–08; see, e.g., Ramos v. Container Maint. of Fla., 
44 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 659 (2011) (applying the Winchester and Herron 
“functional relationship” test to a case arising within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh 
Circuit); Cunningham v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 37 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 76 
(2003) (“[T]he Board applied the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Herron, 
and it has consistently done so in other cases where a circuit court has not 
established its own criteria.”), aff’d sub nom Cunningham v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs, 377 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004); Waugh v. Matt’s Enters., Inc., 33 Ben. 
Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 9 (1999) (adopting the Herron standard in this case, which arose 
under the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction); see also Dryden v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 
43 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 167, 168 (2009) (briefly mentioning the differing 
interpretations of “adjoining” and noting that the Fourth Circuit interpretation has 
not received support outside of its own jurisdiction).  
 346. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text (expressing Congress’s intent to 
expand LHWCA for maritime workers to give them the most expansive coverage). 
 347. See supra text accompanying note 25 (commenting on the Jensen decision’s 
determination that state workers’ compensation coverage applied while the worker 
was on the pier, but no coverage applied after the worker stepped on a gangplank 
towards the ship). 
 348. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 349. See, e.g., Parker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 812, 812 
(1996) (denying cert.); Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 518 U.S. 1028, 1028 
(1996) (denying cert.); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) 
(denying cert.); John T. Clark & Son of Bos., Inc. v. Stockman, 433 U.S. 908, 908 
(1977) (denying cert.); see also New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of 
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (outlining 
the circuit split and the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court); Sidwell v. 
Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1136 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not defined the term “adjoining areas”); Fitzhugh, supra note 3, 
at 318 (lamenting the Supreme Court’s hesitance to reexamine the LHWCA for 
more than two decades).   
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it currently stands.350  Courts would likely reject this as armchair 
lawmaking and abdication of their duty to interpret the law.  Thus, 
the Herron factors provide a more palatable option for judges, 
allowing them to maintain the situs requirement while favoring 
broader results for injured workers who might not qualify for benefits 
under a stricter approach.351 
CONCLUSION 
Congress should legislate to eliminate the situs requirement and to 
further clarify its intent within the statutory text itself.  Alternatively, 
all circuits should revise their case law to reflect Congress’s intent as 
clearly expressed in 1972 legislative history and in the statutory text.  
By implementing Congress’s desire for broad coverage, courts will 
mitigate the emotional, physical, and financial hardship that injured 
maritime workers and their families face, particularly in the case of a 
worker’s death.  In the meantime, the Fifth Circuit and, by extension, 
the Fourth Circuit, should discard their attachment to a “plain 
meaning” interpretation of the LHWCA and revisit their precedent 
with an eye toward Congress’s intent and the Herron factors.352  Doing 
so will ensure relatively homogenous coverage regardless of location 
and relieve longshoremen and harbor workers in these jurisdictions 
of the arbitrariness of a narrow approach to LHWCA coverage under 
the situs requirement. 
                                                          
 350. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 
629, 638 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissing the situs requirement in cases satisfying the status 
requirement because doing so weakens Congress’s goal of eliminating shifting and 
uncertain coverage). 
 351. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (listing the Herron factors). 
 352. See supra note 8 (discussing courts’ adherence to plain meaning interpretation). 
